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“There is nothing which so generally strikes the
imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the
right of property.”1
Sir William Blackstone, 1765.
“[T]he Sovereign has a greater right over the property of
his subjects, where the public good is concerned, than the
owners themselves have.”2
Hugo Grotius, 1625.
“[T]he doctrine of eminent domain is diametrically
opposed to the law of God—the law of nature—and
embodies the very antithesis of the unalienable right of
private property.”3
Gerald R. Thompson, 1990.

I. INTRODUCTION
Across the nation, economic turmoil and the collapse of the housing
market have plunged countless homeowners into financial peril.4
Communities large and small have watched foreclosure signs spring up and
have seen the “American Dream” become increasingly elusive.5 Homes are
now worth only a fraction of what families paid, leaving them with hefty
mortgage payments for value that simply is not there.6 Some residents find
that their only option is to walk away, defaulting on their debts and severely
damaging both their personal credit and the stability of the local economy.7

1. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
2. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 5 (n.p., Kessinger Publishing 2004)
(1625), available at, http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_101.htm.
3. Gerald R. Thompson, The Unalienable Right of Property: Examining the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, 8 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 189, 202 (1990).
4. See infra Part II.A (summarizing the history of the financial crisis).
5. See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 197.
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Leaders in these communities struggle to provide aid to their
constituents, usually with little to no success.8 They feel their pleas fall on
deaf ears at the state and federal levels, leaving them to shoulder the burden
alone.9 Government and bank programs provide limited relief, but many
remain desperately in need of help.10
And desperate times can call for desperate measures. It is in this climate
of desperation that some political leaders have turned to unorthodox
solutions, willing to take bold action to solve the problems plaguing their
citizens.11 Unbridled boldness, however, does not make a solution the right
one. No matter how tempting the proposals marketed by outsiders seem to a
vulnerable and desperate community, it is important that the consequences
and limitations of those actions be realistically considered. This Comment
aims to investigate the legal and practical implications of one of the more
radical plans under consideration.
Specifically, it will dissect the controversial new eminent domain
proposal engineered by the investment firm Mortgage Resolution Partners
(MRP). The firm hopes to utilize the eminent domain power of local
municipalities as a creative solution to the recent collapse of the U.S.
housing market.12 This Comment will study the proposal as applied in the
case of San Bernardino County (S.B. County). Although S.B. County is just
one of the municipalities that have entertained the eminent domain proposal,
this county is “ground zero” for the proposal—until recently, it was “widely
considered to be the local government furthest along in considering the
proposal.”13 Although the proposal appears to be presently “off the table” in
S.B. County,14 the saga surrounding its potential application there is the ideal
case study for thoroughly analyzing the factual and legal issues involved.
Part II provides a brief look at the history of the current financial crisis
8. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 405–06 (2011),
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf;
Kevin Jursinski, The Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis in Florida: A 21st Century Solution, 84 FLA. B.J.
91, 92 (2010).
9. See infra Part II.C–E.
10. See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part II.C (outlining MRP’s proposal).
13. Alejandro Lazo, Lt. Gov. Gavin Newsom Alleges ‘Threats’ Against Mortgage Plan, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/11/business/la-fi-eminent-domain20120911.
14. See infra Part II.E.
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and its effect on S.B. County’s local economy; it then walks through the
proposed eminent domain plan. Part III provides some of the relevant legal
background.
Part IV examines the lawfulness of the mortgage
condemnation proposal on the state level. Part V measures the proposal
against the various protections of the U.S. Constitution. Part VI addresses
the impact and significance of the proposal, and Part VII outlines the current
state of the issue and briefly concludes.
II. HISTORY
A. The History of the Financial Crisis
In 2007 and 2008, the burst of the American “housing bubble” prompted
the country’s longest economic downturn since World War II.15 Economic
and legal commentators present competing theories on how and why the
American housing and financial markets collapsed.16 These suggested
causes, to name but a few, include the nation’s misguided monetary policy, a
global savings surplus, government policies encouraging affordable
homeownership, irrational consumer expectations of rising housing prices,
and an inelastic housing supply.17
In May of 2009, Congress created the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (FCIC) to officially “examine the financial and economic crisis
. . . and explain its causes to the American people.”18 The FCIC’s published

15. Business Cycle Dating Committee Report, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 1 (Sept. 20,
2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf. The committee determined that the original
recession, which began in December of 2007, ended eighteen months later, in June of 2009. Id.
16. See, e.g., Major Coleman IV et al., Subprime Lending and the Housing Bubble: Tail Wags
Dog?, 17 J. HOUSING ECON. 272 (2008) (proposing that the housing bubble was caused jointly by
the subprime market, house price increases, and the changing institutional, political, and regulatory
environment of the time); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Can Cheap Credit Explain the Housing Boom?,
in HOUSING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 301 (Edward L. Glaeser & Todd Sinai eds., 2013) (finding
that low interest rates explain only one-fifth of the rise in home prices); Adam J. Levitin & Susan M.
Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012) (positing a supply-side cause
to the crisis); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Victims or
Villains?, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 733 (2010) (explaining the roles that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac played in the crisis and noting specifically that extreme increases in residential
mortgage defaults triggered the recession in 2008).
17. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 16, at 1179–80.
18. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xv. Unfortunately, even the
congressional report does not provide a definitive opinion: four of the ten members dissented from
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report concluded that the crisis was avoidable, the result of “human action
and inaction,” and named as contributing causes: (1) failures in financial
regulation and supervision;19 (2) failures of corporate governance and risk
management at key financial institutions; and (3) a combination of excessive
borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency.20 It also accused the
federal government of being “ill prepared” and blamed its “inconsistent
response” for contributing to uncertainty and panic in the financial
markets.21
The one thing that commentators can agree on, however, is that one of
the greatest contributors to this economic collapse was the failure of the
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) market.22 MBSs are asset-backed
interests secured by a mortgage or, more frequently, a number of mortgages
in a pool.23 First issued in the 1970s, they have traditionally been used as a
means for smaller financial institutions to reduce the inherent risks of
mortgage lending by selling their interests as mortgagees to the investing
public.24 For these mortgage originators, the MBS system was a proverbial

the report’s conclusions. Id. at 411–39.
In an interesting twist, FCIC chairman Phil Angelides originally became the executive
chairman of Mortgage Resolution Partners, the investment firm behind the eminent domain scheme
discussed in this Comment. Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, Exclusive: Angelides to Lead
Distressed Mortgage Firm, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/ususa-housing-angelides-idUSTRE80C26820120113 [hereinafter Goldstein & Ablan, Angelides to
Lead Distressed Mortgage Firm]; see also infra notes 56–66 and accompanying text (discussing the
eminent domain proposal). This appointment was controversial primarily because, in its fundraising
materials, Mortgage Resolution Partners touted its ability to use its “secret formula” of “legal and
political leverage” in negotiating its deals with municipalities. Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan,
Phil Angelides Gives Up His “Secret Formula”, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/unstructuredfinance/2012/02/13/phil-angelides-gives-up-his-secret-formula/
[hereinafter Goldstein, Phil Angelides Gives Up His “Secret Formula”] (internal quotation marks
omitted). Angelides eventually resigned from his position with the investment firm. See infra notes
83–87 and accompanying text (describing the political objection to this relationship).
19. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xvii–xviii (specifically citing failures by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
20. Id. at xvi–xx.
21. Id. at xxi.
22. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2009).
23. See Ronald Greenspan & William Nolan, Description of the Mortgage and Asset-Backed
Securities Markets, Roles of Principal Participants and Key Terms, in MORTGAGE AND ASSET
BACKED SECURITIES LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 1:1 (Talcott J. Franklin & Thomas F. Nealon III
eds., 2012).
24. Id.; see also Times Topics: Mortgage-Backed Securities, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.ny
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golden goose—by selling their mortgage interests for inclusion in MBS
pools, they would receive immediate revenue from mortgages (instead of
waiting years for full payment) while completely avoiding the risk of the
homeowner defaulting; with that money in hand, the originators could make
new loans to prospective homeowners, and begin the cycle again.25
For decades, these MBSs were viewed as extremely safe investments.26
As this “secondary mortgage market”27 grew, the MBSs became more
complicated in form, more companies began to securitize mortgages, and the
lending standards of the underlying mortgages began to fall.28 Investment
banks began to issue their own “private label” MBSs (PLSs) that comprised
“nonconforming” or “subprime” loans with reduced underwriting
standards—loans not guaranteed by government-sponsored mortgage
entities (GSEs) Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.29 At first, the investing
community viewed PLSs skeptically,30 but, due primarily to the support of
ratings agencies,31 they soon became widely successful.32 Eventually, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac followed suit by lowering their own underwriting
times.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/m/mortgage-backed-securities/index.html (last visited
Jan. 11, 2014) (providing various links to additional pages and news articles discussing MBSs).
25. See, e.g., Chris Wilson, What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?: The Financial Instrument
that Destroyed Bear Stearns, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/explainer/2008/03/what_is_a_mortgagebacked_security.html.
26. See id. (“When the housing market is doing well and interest rates are low, investing in a
mortgage-backed security is a fairly safe bet.”). This was due in part to the high ratings assigned to
them by credit rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch. See infra note 38
(expanding on the role of these agencies).
27. An appropriate definition of “secondary mortgage market” is “the purchase and sale of
MBS[s] either upon their issuance or between market participants.” THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL.,
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 5:1 (2013).
28. Tyler R. Morgan, The Refinancing Crisis in Commercial Real Estate: Dodd-Frank
Threatens to Curtail CMBS Lending, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 374 (2012); see also
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xxiii (naming this as one of the failures leading to the
financial crisis).
29. See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systematic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (2009) (“In contrast [with
GSEs], private-label securitizers did not issue guarantees of credit risk.”).
30. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Editor’s Introduction: Responding to the Financial
Crisis, 2010 SEC. L.R. § 1:2 (Donald C. Langevoort ed., 2010) (“While GSE-issued certificates were
considered near-substitutes for U.S. Treasury securities, private label securities could not
immediately instill confidence.”).
31. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
32. See McCoy, supra note 29, at 1330 (noting that PLS issuance rose from 24% of all MBSs in
2003 to 55% in 2005, amounting to $1.19 trillion in loans).
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standards.33 Banks responded by creating “collateralized mortgage [or debt]
obligations,”34 in which the shares in an MBS were organized into different
“tranches” according to the perceived risk.35
MBSs fell into a dangerous cycle—repeatedly sold, resecuritized,
retranched, and resold—theoretically spreading the risk of any individual
homeowner defaulting so thin that it became practically non-existent.36
Eventually, it became impossible for investors to identify the original
mortgages backing their securities, or their quality, forcing them to rely on
credit rating agencies to determine MBS value.37 For a variety of reasons,
these ratings agencies had been inflating the ratings on even very risky
classes of MBSs.38 These high ratings made the MBSs all the more

33. Other factors also played a role in these lower standards: a major source was pressure from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Richard E. Mendales, The Fall and
Rise of Fannie and Freddie: Securitization After the Meltdown, 42 No.1 UCC L.J. art. 2 (2009)
(“Despite warnings that [MBSs] based on subprime mortgages were significantly more prone to
default than other such securities, [HUD], seeking to aid lower-income families in finding housing,
pressed the GSEs first to buy lower-grade mortgages . . . and then securities backed by subprime
mortgages . . . .”).
According to the FCIC, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “relaxed their underwriting standards
to purchase or guarantee riskier loans and related securities in order to meet stock market analysts’
and investors’ expectations for growth, to regain market share, and to ensure generous compensation
for their executives and employees.” FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xxvi.
34. Mendales, supra note 33.
35. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at 43.
36. Eggert, supra note 22, at 1265.
37. Id. For example, the 3,500 loans targeted in S.B. County, supra Part II.B–C, were
reportedly placed into 2,000 separate trusts, which then issued 17,000 separate trust certificates
(backed by the loans), which were then sold to various investors. Tad Friend, Letter from
California, Home Economics: Can an Entrepreneur’s Audacious Plan Fix the Mortgage Mess?,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2013, at 26, 27.
38. See Eggert, supra note 22, at 1298–1303. A large part of the problem stemmed from
conflicts of interests—the ratings agencies were paid by the entities whose securities they rated.
Mendales, supra note 33. They gave investment-grade ratings to most of the GSEs’ MBSs, even
when the mortgages backing the securities were of low quality. Id.
The overrating of MBSs was another major contributor to the financial meltdown. FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xxv (“We conclude the failures of credit rating agencies
were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction.”). In what would be the first suit of its
kind, the U.S. Justice Department plans to file civil charges against S&P’s Ratings Services,
reportedly accusing it of “knowingly and with the intent to defraud, devised, participated in, and
executed a scheme to defraud investors.” Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, U.S.
Accuses S. & P. of Fraud in Suit on Loan Bundles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2013),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/u-s-and-states-prepare-to-sue-s-p-over-mortgageratings/?hp.
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attractive to investors, further boosting their popularity and value.39
The MBS system was not entirely unlike the classic pyramid scheme—it
could not be sustained forever.40 When the housing bubble burst and
homeowners around the nation defaulted on their loans, the unforeseen spike
in foreclosure rates unveiled the flaws in the MBS system; the loss of the
hundreds of billions of dollars invested in these questionable MBSs “shook
markets as well as financial institutions that had significant exposures to
those mortgages.”41
As of the publication date of the FCIC Report,42 about four million
families had lost their homes to foreclosure in the wake of the housing
bubble burst, and another four and a half million were delinquent in or had
defaulted on their mortgage payments.43 Cities and counties across the
country remain in dire straits and still desperately seek a solution to the
housing woes plaguing their communities.44
B. San Bernardino County’s Economic Situation
The burst of the housing bubble rocked few spots in the country more
severely than S.B. County.45 After decades of high unemployment and low
incomes, the national housing boom of the 1990s and 2000s gave a muchneeded boost to S.B. County’s economy.46 House prices skyrocketed
(homes could sometimes be “flipped” for profit over the course of a few
days), peaking in about 2006, investors saturated the local housing market,

39. Many financial institutions “loaded up on” these risky mortgages and MBSs in the years
preceding the crisis. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xxv. Lehman Brothers, for
example, had amassed $111 billion in them (four times the institution’s total equity). Id. at xx.
40. For an explanation of a “pyramid scheme” in the context of financial investments, see What
is a Pyramid Scheme?, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/
04/042104.asp
41. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xvi.
42. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
43. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 8, at xv.
44. This may explain the open-minded approach many municipalities have taken to the MRP
proposal. See infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (describing positive responses of local
politicians to the eminent domain scheme).
45. Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely Watched by Other Struggling
Communities, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/
eminent-domain-mortgages_n_1836710.html [hereinafter Hallman, Fight Closely Watched].
46. See id.
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and jobs related to the industry flooded into the area.47
When the housing bubble burst, the county’s skyrocketing housingmarket-based economy rapidly collapsed and the inflated value of homes
plummeted.48 Even now, five years later, the county is struggling.
Unemployment and foreclosures in S.B. County hit all-time highs: when the
nationwide unemployment rate was 8.1% in August of 2012,49 the rate in the
Riverside–San Bernardino–Ontario metropolitan area remained as high as
12.3%.50 Meanwhile, the value of homes continued to sink; the median
value of homes in the area, which peaked in 2006 at $382,000, is now
hovering around $167,800.51 Many mortgages acquired or refinanced by
homeowners around the 2006 peak were deeply “underwater”—where the
owner’s equity in the house is less than the value still owed to the lender.52
Reports released in June of 2012 put S.B. County in the top 5% of counties
in the nation for percent of homes underwater.53 Reports published in late
2012 suggest that 2013 will be a slightly brighter year for S.B. County.54
Home prices are rising and foreclosure rates are declining throughout the
country; in S.B. County itself, the number of defaulted loans dropped nearly
22%—the lowest since 2007.55

47. See id. A recent New Yorker article discussing the MRP proposal dubbed California the
“Barbary Coast of loan originators.” Friend, supra note 37, at 26. S.B. County in particular had
become an investing hot spot because of its “cheap dirt.” Id. at 29.
48. Id. at 29. (“After housing prices in the area tripled between 2000 and 2006, the subsequent
plunge cut them by more than half . . . . The ebb tide left only the shells of broken subdivisions . . .
.”).
49. Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
50. News Release—Wednesday, October 3, 2012, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Oct. 12,
2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/metro_10032012.pdf.
51. Hallman, Fight Closely Watched, supra note 45. But see infra notes 54–55 and
accompanying text.
52. Underwater Mortgage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underwatermortgage.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
53. ZILLOW REAL ESTATE RESEARCH, NEGATIVE EQUITY REPORT (June 2012). This research
puts the percent of homes underwater at 52% for S.B. County, as compared to just 30.9% of homes
for the U.S. overall. Id. at 1.
54. See THE CMTY. FOUND., SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY 2012 COMMUNITY INDICATORS
REPORT 8, 27–28 (2012), available at http://www.sbcounty.gov/uploads/cao/feature/
content/2012_cir_sb.pdf; see also infra notes 188–90 and accompanying text.
55. See Joe Nelson, Homeownership Protection Program JPA Cancels October Meeting, SAN
BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN (Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.sbsun.com/ci_21832939/homeownershipprotection-program-jpa-cancels-october-meeting.
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C. The Eminent Domain Proposal
Enter Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP), the private, San Franciscobased venture fund behind the eminent domain proposal that drew
consideration from S.B. County.56 After pitching the program to S.B.
County CEO Greg Devereaux in the fall of the 2011,57 the county Board of
Directors publicly discussed it in a June 2012 meeting.58 MRP’s eminent
domain proposal, dubbed the CARES (Community Action to Restore Equity
and Stability) Program:
•

•
•
•
•

•

Assists communities in using their power of eminent
domain to acquire underwater mortgage loans and
offering to refinance them into sustainable loans with
lower principal balances.
Prevents the costs to communities and neighbors of
future defaults and foreclosures.
Is voluntary; does not affect homeowners who choose
not to refinance.
Is privately funded, requires no taxes or funding from
communities or homeowners.
Targets loans trapped in private securitization trusts;
avoids mortgages whose owners have broad powers to
reduce principal, such as banks and government
agencies.
Creates incentives for homeowners to maintain their
good credit to qualify for the program. Many other
mortgage programs require borrowers to default before

56. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com (last visited Jan. 14,
2014). In its own words, MRP is a “Community Advisory firm working to stabilize local housing
markets and economies by keeping as many homeowners with underwater mortgages in their homes
as possible.” Id.
57. Friend, supra note 37, at 29. An early proponent of the plan, Devereaux was ultimately the
one to announce its abandonment. See infra notes 97–101.
58. Andrew Edwards, Mortgage Resolution Partners Executive Defends Eminent Domain
Proposal,
SAN
BERNARDINO
COUNTY
SUN
(July
25,
2012,
9:00
PM),
http://www.sbsun.com/ci_21168357/mortgage-resolution-partners-executive-defends-eminentdomain-proposal. In addition to Devereaux, California Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom was an
early supporter of MRP’s plan. Friend, supra note 37, at 29. The meeting’s minutes are available on
the county’s website: http://sanbernardino.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=
2444 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
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considering their needs.
Is designed and controlled by each local government,
which chooses the loans and methods for resolving
them to meet local needs.59

In short, MRP plans to raise money from private investors60 and then
front that money to a municipality for the purpose of compensating
mortgage holders for the condemned loans.61 MRP would receive a $4,500
flat fee per loan in addition to return on their investment.62 According to
MRP, the firm itself does not earn any profit share.63 The county would then
use its power of eminent domain to condemn specific mortgages.64 Once the
municipality acquires the loans, homeowners could refinance these
mortgages at a lower principal, reducing mortgage payments.65 The plan
would have applied to approximately 10% of S.B. County loans held in
private security trusts.66
On June 19, 2012, the S.B. County Board of Supervisors took its first
steps toward implementing the MRP proposal.67 Along with the cities of
59. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 56.
60. Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, Exclusive: Investors Tout Controversial
“Condemnation”
for
Housing
Fix,
REUTERS
(June
8,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/08/us-mortgages-condemnation-housingidUSBRE85719Z20120608 [hereinafter Goldstein & Ablan, Investors Tout Controversial
“Condemnation”]. MRP is apparently working with investment banks Evercore Partners, Inc. and
Westwood Capital to find the institutional investors needed to finance the plan. Id.
61. See infra notes 230–42 (discussing compensation requirements on the state level), 263–66
(discussing federal compensation requirements).
62. Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Proposal Arousing Concern from Mortgage
Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/16/sanbernardino-eminent-domain_n_1791773.html [hereinafter Hallman, Proposal Arousing Concern].
63. Fact or Fiction, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com/fact-orfiction (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). However, MRP claims the loans would likely generate a 20%
annual return for its investors. Goldstein & Ablan, Angelides to Lead Distressed Mortgage Firm,
supra note 18.
64. Hallman, Proposal Arousing Concern, supra note 62.
65. Id.
66. Id. However, homeowners would not have to refinance their loans, and could choose to
continue to make payments on the existing loans. FAQs: What Rights and Obligations Will
Homeowners Have When the Local Government Acquires Their Loans? What Happens to
Homeowners
Who
Do
Not
Refinance?,
MORTGAGE
RESOLUTION
PARTNERS,
http://mortgageresolution.com/faqs (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
67. HOMEOWNERSHIP PROTECTION PROGRAM JOINT POWERS AUTHORITY, FIRST AMENDED
AND RESTATED JOINT EXERCISE OF POWERS AGREEMENT § 4 (June 19, 2012) [hereinafter JPA
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Ontario and Fontana, the county created the Homeownership Protection
Program Joint Powers Authority (JPA).68 The JPA was authorized to use the
joint powers of all three government entities (S.B. County, Ontario, and
Fontana),69 including the use of eminent domain.70 The JPA Agreement
granted it all the powers necessary to implement the MRP proposal. Among
other things, it authorized the JPA to “acquire by voluntary purchase, gift,
eminent domain, or otherwise home loans,”71 to “own, maintain, and manage
home loans . . . including, but not limited to, modification, restructuring,
hypothecating, assigning, pledging, securitizing, conveying, and
reconveying,”72 to “receive contributions and donations of property, funds,
services, and other forms of assistance from any source,”73 and to “assign,
delegate, or contract with a Party or third party to perform any of the rights
and duties of the Board.”74
D. The Backlash
When word that S.B. County was considering the MRP proposal went
public, the backlash was fast and ferocious. Politicians on the local, state,
and federal levels voiced strong opinions on the plan; industry
representatives vehemently opposed it; and commentators from various
sectors added their two cents to the nationwide debate.75
AGREEMENT], available at http://www.homeownershipjpa.org/Portals/18/Documents/Agreement.
pdf.
68. Id. The City of Hesperia had also considered joining the JPA, but voted on June 5, 2012 not
to participate. Goldstein & Ablan, Investors Tout Controversial “Condemnation”, supra note 60.
69. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6502 (West 2008) (“If authorized by their [legislature] . . . two or
more public agencies by agreement may jointly exercise any power common to the contracting
parties . . . .”).
70. JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 4(d).
71. Id. This authorizes the condemnation aspect of the proposal and would allow the county to
subsequently transfer the mortgages to a servicer, presumably MRP. See supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
72. JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 4(e). This section would give the JPA the power to
restructure the loans at reduced principals under the MRP proposal.
73. Id. at § 4(i). This power would allow MRP to contribute the funds that the county would
need to condemn the selected loans.
74. Id. at § 4(l). Possibly the most controversial section, this would allow the JPA to transfer
any of its powers directly to MRP.
75. The Wall Street Journal published a few memorable critiques, calling the plan, among other
things, “grand theft mortgage” and “an eminently bad idea.” See Grand Theft Mortgage: American
Enterprise Institute Fellow Ed Pinto on California Cities that Want to Seize and Refinance
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Leaders of economically troubled municipalities generally supported the
plan, or at least expressed cautious optimism. Sacramento Vice Mayor
Angelique Ashby, for example, was vocal in her support of the MRP
proposal, and her desire to bring the plan to Sacramento.76 The proposal also
piqued the interest of other California communities, like Elk Grove—Gary
Davis, an Elk Grove city councilman, reportedly spoke with MRP and was
“intrigued” by the plan.77 At present, at least one community has actually
voted to enact the proposal: Richmond, California.78 However, at least one
high-profile local politician has expressly rejected the plan: Chicago Mayor
Rahm Emanuel.79 After considering MRP’s proposal, which could affect as
many as 20,000 Chicago homeowners, Emanuel decided that the MRP plan
was not “the right way to address the problem,” telling reporters: “I don’t
think it’s the power of the city . . . to deal with the housing issue. We have a
national issue. I think we have to address the issue. I just don’t think that’s
the right instrument.”80
Mortgages Under the Auspices of Eminent Domain, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2012),
http://live.wsj.com/video/opinion-grand-theft-mortgage/8CC3E75C-2DA4-4550-B3C0-97D78CA74
902.html#!8CC3E75C-2DA4-4550-B3C0-97D78CA74902; An Eminently Bad Idea, WALL ST. J.
(July 12, 2012), at A16.
76. Peter S. Goodman, Eminent Domain as Underwater Mortgages Fix: Why Some Cities Are
Considering
Unorthodox
Measure,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Oct.
1,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/01/eminent-domain-mortgages_n_1917391.html.
In an
interview with the Sacramento Bee, Ashby explained that her community “is one of the worst-hit
communities in the country,” giving vivid examples of struggling homeowners in her neighborhood.
Hudson Sangree, Sacramento Area Officials Explore Using Eminent Domain to Aid Underwater
Homeowners,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Aug.
11,
2012),
at
1A,
available
at
http://www.sacbee.com/2012/08/11/4715792/sacramento-area-officials-explore.html.
77. Sangree, supra note 76 (“I’m intrigued by the notion . . . . We’re engaged in a conversation
with [MRP] to better understand it.”).
78. Jim Christie, California City Backs Plan to Seize Negative Equity Mortgages, REUTERS
(Sept.
11,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/us-richmond-eminentdomainidUSBRE98A0FN20130911; Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Richmond, California Mortgage
Plan, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us-usa-mortgagesruling-idUSBRE98F12M20130916 [hereinafter Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Richmond].
79. Mary Ellen Podmolik & John Byrne, Emanuel: Eminent Domain Not ‘The Right Instrument’
to
Address
Underwater
Mortgages,
CHI.
TRIBUNE
(Aug.
14,
2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-14/business/chi-emanuel-eminent-domain-not-the-rightinstrument-to-address-underwater-mortgages-20120814_1_eminent-domain-underwaterhomeowners-mortgages.
80. Id. Emanuel’s willingness to defer to federal authority on the issue might be attributable to
his former roles in Washington as a U.S. Congressman from Illinois and President Obama’s Chief of
Staff. Jeff Zeleny & Peter Baker, Rahm Emanuel Accepts Chief of Staff Post, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/07elect.html.
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At the state level, California Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom—
while not expressly endorsing the plan—encourages “bold action” in solving
the crisis, and vocally defended S.B. County’s consideration of the
proposal.81 Newsom went as far as complaining to the U.S. Department of
Justice’s antitrust division when he believed the mortgage and finance
industries, as well as the federal government, had threatened the
communities considering the plan.82
The federal government more vehemently opposed the MRP proposal.
Some politicians, like U.S. Representative Patrick McHenry, a Republican
from North Carolina, have challenged MRP’s financial motivation and the
potential for corruption.83 McHenry complained in a letter to the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development, Shaun Donovan, about the risks of
“cronyism or conflicts” associated with MRP,84 and asked for information on
the preventative steps being taken.85 The controversy erupted after MRP, in
soliciting funding, touted its ability to use “legal and political leverage” in
negotiating its deals with municipalities.86 Angelides eventually left MRP,

81. Andrew Edwards, California’s Lieutenant Governor Steps into Mortgage Debate, SAN
BERNARDINO COUNTY SUN (July 26, 2012), http://www.sbsun.com/ci_21177556/californiaslieutenant-governor-steps-into-mortgage-debate?IADID=Search-www.sbsun.com-www.sbsun.com.
In a phone interview, Newsom told the San Bernardino County Sun that: “The economy in our state
is not going to rebound until we address the number one thing holding us back, and that’s these
homes that are underwater.” Id.
82. Newsom’s letter read, in part: “I am most disturbed by the threats leveled by the mortgage
industry and some in the federal government who have coercively urged local governments to reject
consideration of any proposal that would exercise the powers constitutionally granted local
governments to use eminent domain.” Lazo, supra note 13; see also infra notes 88–90 (discussing
federal legislation against the MRP proposal).
83. Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, Financial Crisis Chair Angelides Quits Mortgage
Firm, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-mortgages-angelidesidUSTRE81C20A20120213 [hereinafter Goldstein & Ablan, Angelides Quits Mortgage Firm].
Representative McHenry is the chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform
subcommittee on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Id. Among other functions (like
overseeing government bailouts), TARP manages the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program—
which it created to provide mortgage relief to homeowners and prevent avoidable foreclosures—and
its cornerstone program, the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Housing, U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARPPrograms/housing/pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2014). HAMP “reduces [homeowners’]
mortgage payments to affordable levels for qualifying borrowers” and is the primary federal
competitor to the MRP proposal. Id.
84. Goldstein & Ablan, Phil Angelides Gives Up His “Secret Formula”, supra note 18.
85. Goldstein & Ablan, Angelides Quits Mortgage Firm, supra note 83.
86. Goldstein, Phil Angelides Gives Up His “Secret Formula”, supra note 18 (noting that
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but Representative McHenry insisted that he still wanted Donovan to
respond to his questions.87 In a more extreme reaction to the plan, U.S.
Representative John Campbell, a Republican from California, introduced a
bill in the House of Representatives intended to discourage municipalities
from taking action like that featured in MRP’s proposal.88 The goal of the
bill, creatively named the Defending American Taxpayers from Abusive
Government Takings Act, was:
To prohibit Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from purchasing,
the FHA from insuring, and the Department of Veterans
Affairs from guaranteeing, making, or insuring, a mortgage
that is secured by a residence or residential structure
located in a county in which the State has used the power of
eminent domain to take a residential mortgage.89
The bill currently rests with the House Financial Services Committee, its
fate to be determined at some later date.90
Another instrumentality of the federal government has also expressed
disapproval of the plan: the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The
FHFA, which rejected a principal reduction strategy similar to MRP’s for
GSE loans,91 published in the Federal Register that:

Angelides “quietly stepped down from the firm” about two weeks after the story of his involvement
was published on Reuters).
87. Id.
88. H.R. 6397, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
112/hr6397 (last visited Jan. 16, 2014). The bill, cosponsored by eleven other House Republicans,
was introduced on September 13, 2012 and referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
Id.; see also Jann Swanson, Congress Gets Bill Prohibiting Eminent Domain Mortgage Seizures,
MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/09132012_
eminent_domain_loan_mods.asp. The bill was re-introduced as H.R. 2733 on July 18, 2013 and has
an estimated 2% chance of being enacted. H.R. 2733, 112th Cong. (2013), available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2733 (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).
89. H.R. 6397. This bill was one of the actions challenged by Gavin Newsom as being
retaliatory. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
90. H.R. 2733.
91. Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Acting Director, FHFA, to the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs (July 31, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from Edward J. DeMarco], available
at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24110/PF_LettertoCong73112.pdf. The letter read, in part:
After much study, I have concluded that [the GSEs’] adoption of [this
principal reduction plan] would not make a meaningful improvement in
reducing foreclosures in a cost effective way for taxpayers.
....
. . . [The] longer-term view by investors that the mortgage contract is less
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FHFA has significant concerns about the use of eminent
domain to revise existing financial contracts and the
alteration of the value of [GSE] or Bank securities
holdings. . . .
FHFA has determined that action may be necessary on
its part as conservator for the [GSEs] and as regulator for
the Banks to avoid a risk to safe and sound operations and
to avoid taxpayer expense.
Among questions raised regarding the proposed use of
eminent domain are the constitutionality of such use; the
application of federal and state consumer protection laws;
the effects on holders of existing securities; the impact on
millions of negotiated and performing mortgage contracts;
the role of courts in administering or overseeing such a
program, including available judicial resources; fees and
costs attendant to such programs; and, in particular, critical
issues surrounding the valuation by local governments of
complex contractual arrangements that are traded in
national and international markets.92
Not surprisingly, the strongest opposition comes from those with the
most to lose from the MRP plan—the industries currently owning, servicing,
and profiting from the considered mortgages. Most notable is the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). In its official
position statement on the topic, SIFMA “strongly object[ed] to any proposed
use of eminent domain to take mortgage loans out of securitized pools.”93 In
the same statement, SIFMA also explained that “[e]minent domain stands to
hurt the very borrowers it seeks to help; there are better alternatives.”94
secure than ever before . . . . could lead to higher mortgage rates, a
constriction in mortgage credit lending or both, outcomes that would be
inconsistent with FHFA’s mandate to promote stability and liquidity in
mortgage markets and access to mortgage credit.
Id. at 1, 4.
92. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47652 (Aug. 9,
2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-09/pdf/2012-19566.pdf.
93. Eminent Domain Resource Center, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N,
http://www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/securitization/eminent-domain/overview/ (last visited
Jan. 17, 2014).
94. Id.
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Along with twenty-five other trade organizations,95 SIFMA submitted a joint
response to the FHFA’s request for comments on the proposed eminent
domain solution, citing as objectionable the impact of such a plan on
mortgage markets and mortgage investors; the valuation and profit
motivation that underlies the plan; and the various legal issues discussed in
this Comment.96
E. The Demise of the Proposal (for S.B. County)
On January 24, 2013 the JPA board met to discuss, among other things,
whether it would actually pursue the MRP eminent domain proposal.97 After
months of debate, the JPA board voted unanimously not to consider the
MRP proposal further.98 Greg Devereaux, chairman of the JPA and county
CEO—the same Greg Devereaux that instigated the MRP dialog months
earlier99—announced that the JPA would be “taking [the proposal] off the
table” due to a lack of public support.100 David Wert, spokesman for S.B.

95. Letter from SIFMA et al. to Alfred Pollard, General Counsel, FHFA (Sept. 7, 2012),
available at http://www.sifma.org/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=8589940214 [hereinafter Letter
from SIFMA]. These include trade organizations like the American Bankers Association, the
California Bankers Association, the Consumer Bankers Association, the Association of Mortgage
Investors, and the American Insurance Association. Id.
96. Id.
97. Alejandro Lazo, San Bernardino County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-eminent-domain20130124,0,4577228.story [hereinafter Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan];
see also Meeting Agenda for January 24, 2013, Homeownership Prot. Program Joint Powers Auth.
(Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://sanbernardino.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?publish_id=531;
Press Release, Homeownership Prot. Program JPA, JPA Declines to Consider Eminent Domain
Proposals,
(Jan.
24,
2013),
available
at
http://www.sbcounty.gov/uploads/CAO/
pressreleases/content/JPA_RFQ_PR_1-24-13.pdf [hereinafter JPA Press Release].
98. Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97.
99. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
100. Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97. “Devereaux also
echoed criticisms by the mortgage industry and Wall Street groups, who have argued such a plan
would spark lawsuits, higher interest rates and a tightened market for borrowers.” Alejandro Lazo,
San Bernardino County Abandons Mortgage Plan, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/25/business/la-fi-eminent-domain-20130125 [hereinafter Lazo,
County Abandons Mortgage Plan]; see also Kathleen Pender, San Bernadino County Won’t Use
Eminent Domain to Seize Mortgages, S.F. CHRON. BLOG (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://blog.sfgate.com/pender/2013/01/24/san-bernadino-county-wont-use-eminent-domain-to-seizemortgages/. “Many experts warned that eminent domain would destabilize an already weak local
housing market, . . . Devereaux . . . said in a press release.” Id.
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County, reported that “[s]ome residents said, ‘We don’t like eminent domain
in any form.’”101
In addition to this negative feedback from residents, the proposal had a
“chilling effect” on the county’s relationship with other parties.102 In the
county’s statement, Wert went on to say that:
The presence of a potential eminent domain proposal was
causing problems with us developing relationships with
other people who actually have solutions. The people we
should be relying on to help solve this problem . . . are the
bankers, the mortgage industry, the investment community.
Just the presence of eminent domain was causing that
relationship not to develop. It had a chilling effect.103
Rather than continuing to explore MRP’s plan, the JPA voted to explore
additional proposed solutions to the mortgage problems plaguing the
county.104 Exactly what steps the JPA will take to further these programs,

101. Pender, supra note 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Pender, supra note 100 (acknowledging the existence of such “chilling effect”). Here,
“parties” refers to those like SIFMA and the federal government. See supra notes 94–96 and
accompanying text.
103. Pender, supra note 100. In an interview following the plan’s rejection SIFMA’s director
reported:
We are encouraged to hear that the county has decided it will not pursue use
of eminent domain to restructure mortgages . . . . As SIFMA has said, the
unprecedented, potential use of eminent domain would cause severe damage
to struggling housing markets and is likely unconstitutional on its face. We
are pleased that the county has recognized these risks and decided to move in
other directions.
Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
104. Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97. At the same
January 24, 2013 meeting, the board approved an agreement to work “with finance and real estate
industry groups on publicizing existing government and bank programs available to homeowners.”
Imran Ghori, San Bernardino County: Eminent Domain Mortgage Solution Rejected, PRESS
ENTERPRISE
(Jan.
24,
2013),
http://www.pe.com/local-news/politics/imran-ghoriheadlines/20130124-san-bernardino-county-eminent-domain-solution-rejected.ece
[hereinafter
Ghori, Eminent Domain Rejected]; see also JPA Press Release, supra note 97. The county’s current
programs include “www.saveyourhomesbcounty.org,” a county website designed to “make [local]
homeowners aware of programs and local events aimed at addressing foreclosures and negative
equity.” Id. The JPA plans to draft a new version of its written request for proposals once the
eminent domain restriction has been added, along with a new “risk assessment” requirement for
submitted plans. Id.
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however, is unclear.105
The JPA appears to have definitively retired the plan, but the MRP
proposal lives on. MRP Chairman Steven Gluckstern reports that his firm
remains in talks with over thirty other communities.106 In fact, one of the
JPA municipalities, the City of Fontana, has indicated that it might move
forward independently; Fontana’s mayor, Acquanetta Warren, asserted that
it would be irresponsible for the city not to consider all options to aid
homeowners.107 The most promising municipality today, however, is
Richmond.108 Nevertheless, For S.B. County, the proposal appears to be
dead in the water.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Origin and Scope of Eminent Domain Power
In order to understand the limitations and range of the county’s power of
eminent domain, one must understand the source of this particular brand of
police power.109 Where does the county’s authority to take private property
come from? More importantly, what is the extent of that power currently
exercisable by the JPA?
Eminent domain—the “power of a governmental entity to take privately
owned property and convert it to public use”110 —is considered an inherent
attribute of sovereignty.111 It is “necessary to the very existence of the

105. The power assigned to the JPA by its member entities was fairly specific to the MRP
proposal. See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text (discussing the express powers of the
JPA). That being the case, the JPA’s ability to implement broader plans may be ineffective.
106. Ghori, Eminent Domain Rejected, supra note 104 (“A handful of [these communities] could
begin acquiring mortgages within the next month, [Gluckstern said in January 2013].”).
107. Id. Mayor Warren reportedly complained that: “This is falling on complete deaf ears on the
state and federal level . . . . They have abandoned the guy who plays by the rules, the guy who pays
his mortgage every month. Nobody wants to talk about this guy.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
108. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Again, because the events in Richmond occurred
after this Comment was initially drafted, it will be discussed only briefly.
109. See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 3 (2012) (“Eminent domain is a right founded on the
law of necessity which is inherent in sovereignty and essential to the existence of government.”).
110. Id. at § 2.
111. Cnty. of San Mateo v. Coburn, 63 P. 78, 79 (Cal. 1900). See also 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent
Domain § 3 (2012).
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government.”112 The takings clauses of the federal and state constitutions,
therefore, do not grant the power to condemn property; they “merely place
The only external limitations on
limitations upon its exercise.”113
California’s power as a sovereign entity are those enumerated in the United
States Constitution.114 Internally, the power to exercise eminent domain is
limited further by the California constitution115 and any restrictions
voluntarily enacted by the state legislature.116
On the other hand, municipal corporations (like counties and cities) do
not have an inherent power of eminent domain.117 Counties and cities “can
exercise [eminent domain], if at all, only when expressly authorized by
law.”118 In California, both the state constitution and the Government Code
provide this express authorization.119 Article XI, section 7 of California’s
constitution provides that “[a] county or city may make and enforce within
its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not
in conflict with general laws.”120 Statutory law—contained within the
California Government Code—acknowledging the assignment of
condemnation power complements the state constitution’s broad grant of
authority.121
This broad authority trickles down in its entirety to the county, but S.B.
County is additionally restricted by a self-imposed limitation incorporated
112. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.14[2] [hereinafter NICHOLS].
113. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Chevalier, 340 P.2d 598, 601 (Cal. 1959) (in bank);
Gober v. Stubbs, 682 So. 2d 430, 433 (Ala. 1996).
114. See infra Part V (analyzing whether federal constitutional restrictions will block the S.B.
County proposal).
115. “Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when just
compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the
owner.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a) (emphasis added).
116. See infra Part IV (discussing legality of the mortgage takings within state law).
117. City of S.F. v. Ross, 279 P.2d 529, 531 (Cal. 1955) (in bank).
118. Id.
119. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (state constitution’s eminent domain clause); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 25350.5 (West 2012) (state’s statutory eminent domain scheme).
120. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
121. GOV’T § 25350.5 (“The board of supervisors of any county may acquire by eminent domain
any property necessary to carry out any of the powers or functions of the county.”). A careful
reading of the California Government Code reveals that “property,” as it is used here, “includes real
and personal property.” Id. § 180. Because the county is limited to the powers expressly granted to
it, the fact that the California Code assigning the power to condemn “property” does not expressly
include intangible property in its definition might present a legitimate, yet likely surmountable,
challenge. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 180, 25350.5.
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into the county’s charter via a voter-approved amendment in 2006.122 It
mandates that the county “may not exercise the power of eminent domain to
acquire property from any private Owner [of fee interest], without such
Owner’s consent, when the purpose of the acquisition is to convey the
property so acquired to any private party.”123 This local restriction, of
course, would not apply to other municipalities considering the MRP
proposal, but it is still relevant in a broader analysis—local governments
across the nation have commonly adopted this sort of charter amendment or
ordinance.124
Finally, the JPA itself is limited to exercising powers (which are
legitimately held by the county and the other parties to the Joint Powers
Authority agreement125) that are expressly granted to it in the agreement
itself.126 These include the powers to “acquire [mortgages] by voluntary
purchase, gift, eminent domain, or otherwise”;127 to “own, maintain, and
manage” these mortgages through various means;128 and to “assign, delegate,
or contract with . . . third part[ies] to perform any of the rights and duties of
the [JPA].”129
The question of whether the mortgage takings proposed in S.B. County
would have withstood judicial scrutiny depends on whether the plan falls
within the bounds of these limitations. Because the county’s power of
eminent domain flows from the state’s authority, the county is subject to all
laws constraining the state.130 Any taking that violates local, state, or federal
limitations on eminent domain will fully invalidate the MRP proposal.131
122. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, CAL. CHARTER Foreword (2006), available at
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir/CharterReviewCommittee/SanBernardinoCharter.pdf.
123. Id. art. VI, § 5; see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
124. These laws were enacted in the wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), a
decision that expanded the scope of eminent domain. See infra note 159.
125. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
126. See JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 4.
127
Id. §4(d)
128. Id. § 4(e). Specifically, these means include, but are not limited to, “modification,
restructuring, hypothecating, assigning, pledging, securitizing, conveying, and reconveying.” Id.
129. Id. § 4(l); see also supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text (explaining the correlation
between the JPA’s powers and those required by the MRP proposal).
130. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
131. See Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 163 (2012) [hereinafter Hockett, It Takes a
Village].
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B. Can Mortgages Be Taken?
While there is no record of California—or any other state—using
eminent domain to condemn a mortgage (as opposed to extinguishing a
mortgage as a result of a real property taking),132 case law strongly suggests
that states can take mortgages just like any other kind of property.133 As far
back as 1848, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to draw a distinction
between the application of eminent domain to physical property and its
application to intangible property.134 The California Supreme Court has
mirrored that sentiment, holding that “neither the federal nor the state
Constitution distinguishes between property which is real or personal,
tangible or intangible.”135
In City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, the California Supreme Court
considered whether the City of Oakland had acted constitutionally in its
unprecedented use of eminent domain in attempting to condemn the Oakland
Raiders football franchise.136 In that case, the court acknowledged that,
unless expressly restricted, “the right of eminent domain encompasses
property of every kind and character,”137 including “patent rights, franchises,
charters or any other form of contract.”138 The California Supreme Court
viewed the Oakland Raiders franchise as a collection of personal property,
real property, intellectual property, and contractual rights—all of which can,
at least in theory, be taken by the state.139 Conceptually, there is no reason

132. Although he believes the firm’s plan will withstand legal challenges, even MRP’s chairman
acknowledges that using eminent domain for mortgages is untested. Goldstein & Ablan, Investors
Tout Controversial “Condemnation,” supra note 60.
133. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Oakland Raiders I), 646 P.2d 835, 838–40
(Cal. 1982) (in bank). But cf. San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd. v. Handlery Hotel, Inc., 86 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 473, 484 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the possibility to lease property in the future is not
an interest, but contractual options to renew are).
134. W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 534 (1848) (concluding that such a distinction
“has no foundation in reason”).
135. Oakland Raiders I, 646 P.2d at 840.
136. Id. at 835.
137. Id. at 839 (quoting 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 87 (2012)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
138. Id. (quoting NICHOLS, supra note 112, § 2.01[2]) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. See generally id. In Oakland Raiders I, the respondents use the phrase “network of
intangible contractual rights.” Id. at 837. This case was eventually remanded and the city was found
to have acted unconstitutionally. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Oakland Raiders II), 220 Cal.
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that mortgages—nothing more than contractual debt obligations secured by
an interest in real property140—should not be considered property for the
purposes of eminent domain proceedings.
C. Where is a Mortgage Located?
Traditionally, a government entity can exercise the power of eminent
domain over any property physically located within its boundaries.141 When
eminent domain is extended to intangible property, it becomes less clear
where the property is “located” and whether the government entity can
lawfully condemn that property.142 In Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of
Baltimore, the Seventh Circuit encountered an interesting twist on the facts
in Oakland Raiders that allowed it to address the issue of intangible property
jurisdiction.143 The controversy began with failed lease negotiations between
the owners and operators of the Baltimore Colts’ (now the Indianapolis
Colts) stadium and the team.144 When the Colts began negotiating with a
new venue, located in Indianapolis, the Maryland Senate attempted to keep
the team in Maryland by initiating eminent domain proceedings against the
team.145 Upon learning of this, the team “fled Baltimore under the cloak of
darkness,” literally loading the team’s equipment into moving vans and
driving to Indianapolis.146
This case raised jurisdiction issues that the Supreme Court had not
previously addressed.147 The Court has, however, addressed the issue of

Rptr. 153, 154, 158 (Ct. App. 1985); see also discussion infra Part V.C.
140. 54A AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 1 (2012). In title theory jurisdictions like California, a
mortgage can be defined as “in essence a defeasible deed, requiring the grantee to reconvey the
property held as security to the grantor upon satisfaction of the underlying debt or fulfillment of
established conditions.” Id.
141. NICHOLS, supra note 112, § 2.07 (“[Eminent domain is] inherently limited to subjects within
the state’s jurisdiction.”); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 181 (West 2012) (reserving to the
government the “original and ultimate right to all property within the limits of the State” (emphasis
added)).
142. See supra Part III.B.
143. Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Balt., 741 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1984).
144. See id. at 955.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Ellen Z. Mufson, Note, Jurisdictional Limitations on Intangible Property in Eminent
Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60 IND. L.J. 389, 392 (1985) (“[T]he main difficulty lies
in determining just where the franchise was located at the time of the suit.”).
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intangible property location in other contexts—for example, the sovereign
power of taxation.148 Traditionally, “[f]or the purposes of taxation, a debt149
has its situs at the residence of the creditor, and may there be taxed.”150 A
debt is not the property of the debtor “in any sense”;151 it is the property of
the creditor, and is taxed as such.152 The creditors holding ownership rights
to the mortgages, in this case, could be located anywhere in the world.
Although neither California nor U.S. Supreme Court precedent squarely
addresses the jurisdiction issues faced here, treatment under federal tax law
is telling. The fact that federal tax law treats mortgages as intangible
property located in the creditor’s domiciliary state indicates that the power
of eminent domain (a sovereign power like taxation) will follow suit.153
Accordingly, if the mortgages themselves are determined to exist beyond the
boundaries of the state, the MRP plan will likely fail on those grounds
alone.154
IV. ANALYSIS ON THE STATE LEVEL
A. Violation of Local Law?
The first hurdles that the S.B. County proposal would face are those
148. Id. at 395–96. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 436–37
(1980) (applying a minimum contacts test in taxing a foreign entity).
149. A “debt” is analogous to a mortgage here. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. In
title theory states like California, the government would theoretically be condemning the title and the
contractual obligation. See supra note 140. Even if the “title” is conveyed, it cannot be taken except
as part of the entire mortgage obligation. First, taking the title of the homes was expressly excluded
from the JPA’s powers. JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, Recital C. Additionally, although taking
the title from the mortgagor in title theory states seems simpler, doing this would result in the
government holding exclusive title to the house—this would require the creation of an entirely new
mortgage with the homeowner and infinitely complicate the plan, far beyond the scope of this
Comment.
150. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 491 (1879) (holding that a state may tax debt of its
residents upon a citizen of another state, secured by a deed of trust or mortgage upon real estate
situated in that other state). This doctrine is known as mobilia sequuntur personam—“movables
follow the . . . person.” See Mufson, supra note 147, at 391 & n.11 (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 905 (5th ed. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 213 (1930).
152. Id. (“[D]ebts can have no locality separate from the parties to whom they are due.”).
153. See Mufson, supra note 147, at 410–11 (“[T]he rule of mobilia sequuntur personam for
intangible property provides a workable standard for eminent domain.”).
154. NICHOLS, supra note 112, § 2.07.
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created by its own local laws.155 The JPA’s use of eminent domain is
indirectly considered action by the state legislative body,156 but the county
must still follow its own municipal law and charter.157 In this case, S.B.
County’s charter does in fact contain a provision expressly limiting its use of
eminent domain.158 Specifically, it prohibits taking property for the purpose
of “convey[ing] the property so acquired to any private party.”159
The question then becomes whether the purpose of the S.B. proposal is
indeed to convey to a private party, or whether a subsequent conveyance to
MRP would solely be a consequential benefit for the greater purpose of
reducing home loan principals, etc. The statute’s use of the word “purpose”
leaves room for ambiguity, but it seems likely that California courts will
hold that the S.B. County proposal would violate this amendment of the
county’s charter. Conveying to third parties is an express power assigned to
the Homeownership Protection Program JPA,160 and the MRP proposal
would involve the transfer of mortgages to third parties (as opposed to the
county holding and servicing the loans itself), if only for the purposes of
coordinating servicing and resolution of acquired mortgages.
Regardless of whether the true “purpose” of the proposed taking is
debatable, California law dictates that “[s]tatutory language defining
eminent domain powers is strictly construed and any reasonable doubt
concerning the existence of the power is resolved against the entity.”161
There is surely at least a “reasonable doubt” that this sort of taking is
precluded by the county’s charter and, using this standard, the MRP proposal
155. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining the likely relevance of this local
analysis to future manifestations of the MRP proposal).
156. For example, the JPA is exercising the county’s eminent domain power as assigned to it in
the Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement. JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, § 4(d).
157. The principles that apply to construing statutes also apply to the interpretation of county
charter provisions and ordinances. See Arntz v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 568 (Ct.
App. 2010).
158. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, CAL. CHARTER, art. VI, § 5 (2006), available at
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir/CharterReviewCommittee/SanBernardinoCharter.pdf.
159. Id. This is just one of countless similar laws passed around the country in the aftermath of
the private-party-to-private-party economic development takings decision of Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the
Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009).
160. JPA AGREEMENT § 4(e) (granting power to engage in “conveying” and “reconveying”).
161. Burbank–Glendale–Pasadena Airport Auth. v. Hensler, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 729, 733 (Ct. App.
2000) (quoting Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 566 (Ct. App.
1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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could have been blocked in S.B. County on these grounds alone.162
Additionally, looking to the Board of Supervisors’ intent in supporting
the measure creating this amendment provides insight into its intended
scope.163 The Board itself urged voters to approve the amendment, stating in
its officially filed argument that “[t]he power of eminent domain must be
limited and must only be used in cases of a demonstrated public necessity
such as highway or flood control channel.”164 The Board argued that this
justified a charter amendment, as opposed to a mere ordinance, in order to
ensure that “this protection of property rights is . . . not subject to change by
any future Boards of Supervisors.”165
Despite the expressed intent that the amendment not be changed, a
county’s charter is not immutable.166 If S.B. County truly wishes to push
through these proposed mortgage takings, there is a procedure for repealing
this provision of its charter and defaulting its power of eminent domain to
the maximum level assigned to it by the state.167 The California Constitution
establishes that: “[A] county or city may adopt a charter by majority vote of
its electors voting on the question. . . . A charter may be amended, revised,
or repealed in the same manner.”168
162. Additionally, a taking for the sole purpose of transferring property to a private party, without
a public good being served, is always invalid. See infra Part IV.C.1. If the county charter’s
additional provision (added on November 7, 2006) is not read to prohibit these mortgage takings,
then the charter is essentially “toothless”—it provides no additional limitation and would not change
the scope of the county’s power. SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, CAL. CHARTER Foreword (2006),
available
at
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir/CharterReviewCommittee/SanBernardinoCharter.pdf.
It
seems unlikely that the county would expressly add this limitation (by amendment) if it did not mean
to change the scope of local eminent domain power. See infra note 163 and accompanying text
(demonstrating the legislative intent here).
163. San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors & the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n,
Measure “O”, Argument in Favor (on file with author). No arguments were filed in opposition to the
measure. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The amendment was eventually approved by a 37% margin in the November 7, 2006
general election. Nov. 7, 2006 General Election Results, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY ELECTIONS
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR OF VOTERS (Dec. 1, 2006), http://cms.sbcounty.gov/Portals/9/Elections/
Past_Elections/2006-11-06_ElectionResults.pdf.
166. S.B. County’s charter was originally approved by the State Legislature and filed with the
Secretary of State on April 7, 1913 and has been amended thirty-six times since then. SAN
BERNARDINO
COUNTY,
CAL.
CHARTER
Foreword
(2006),
available
at
http://www.co.sanmateo.ca.us/bos.dir/CharterReviewCommittee/SanBernardinoCharter.pdf.
167. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a).
168. Id.
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So, S.B. County could have overcome this obstacle, but not without
substantial effort. The issue would have had to go to the people and receive
a majority vote in a municipal election.169 In a practical sense, this challenge
at the local level might have been one of the hardest to overcome.170 If the
S.B. County charter had to be amended, the sheer logistics required might
have discouraged the county from moving forward with the mortgage
takings proposal, or at least delayed it substantially.171
B. Violation of California Statutory Law?
Courts will not generally consider broader constitutional issues if the
condemnation action is unlawful according to applicable statutes.172 In this
case, California has enacted an extensive set of requirements, limitations,
and procedures for the use of eminent domain173—eminent domain can only
be exercised in accordance with those rules and procedures.174 The
California Civil Procedure Code establishes three specific requirements for
any use of eminent domain: (1) “public interest and necessity require the
project”; (2) “[t]he project is planned or located in the manner that will be
most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury”;
and (3) “[t]he property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.”175
1. Public Interest and Necessity Must Require the Project
California statutory law demands that public interest and necessity
require the MRP project.176 Although this is a fact-sensitive inquiry, and one
169. Id. See also, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9102 (West 2013) (“[N]othing in this article shall be
construed to allow a board of supervisors to enact, amend, or otherwise revise a county charter
without submitting the proposal to the voters.”).
170. The California Elections Code provides extensive regulation of county elections. ELEC.
§9100–90.
171. See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text.
172. See Gatto v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 556 (Ct. App. 2002) (“If this statutory
violation is established, it would be unnecessary for us to address the constitutional question, as
constitutional issues ordinarily will be resolved on appeal only if ‘absolutely necessary’ and not if
the case can be decided on any other ground.” (quoting Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, 195 P.2d 1, 9
(Cal. 1948))).
173. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1230.010–1274.17 (West 2007).
174. Id. § 1230.020.
175. Id. § 1240.030.
176. Id. § 1240.030(a). “Public interest and necessity” is read to include “all aspects of the public
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in which the decision of the legislative body will be given great deference,177
this necessity is still subject to judicial review.178 For the purposes of this
requirement, the details of specific mortgages are irrelevant—the court will
review the eminent domain plan in its entirety for the requisite public
interest and necessity.179
The stated purpose of this project is to “assist in preserving home
ownership and occupancy for homeowners with negative equity,” to “avoid
the negative impacts of underwater loans and further foreclosures,” and to
“enhance the economic vitality and the health of . . . communities.”180
Proponents asserted that the proposal was needed to address the housing
crisis;181 however, data provided by the FHFA suggests that it may not be.182
Little independent research or hard evidence was provided suggesting that
the FHFA’s conclusions on principal reduction are invalid, or that S.B.
County’s particular situation warranted a different approach,183 but the
good including but not limited to social, economic, environmental, and esthetic considerations.” Id.
(Legis. Comm. Comments).
177. See, e.g., Shell Cal. Pipeline Co. v. Compton, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 758–59 (Ct. App. 1995)
(“Public use and necessity are to be construed liberally in favor of the condemnor.”).
178. CIV. § 1230.050.
179. See infra Part IV.B.3.
180. JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, Recital C.
181. See, e.g., Yuki Noguchi, County Considers Eminent Domain as Foreclosure Fix, NPR NEWS
(July 13, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/13/156683302/county-considers-eminent-domain-asforeclosure-fix (explaining that, in Gluckstern’s view, what is “needed to undo [the mortgage crisis]
. . . is a powerful legal tool [like MRP’s eminent domain proposal] that can force mortgage investors
to sell those loans and cut through all the red tape”).
182. Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, supra note 91 (refusing to implement a principal
reduction/forgiveness plan—the same strategy that MRP would use on S.B. County mortgages—for
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgages). In his letter to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, DeMarco explained that principal reduction “would not make a meaningful
improvement in reducing foreclosures in a cost effective way for taxpayers.” Id.; see supra Part
II.D.
183. See generally Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 131 (discussing the FHFA’s
conclusions). MRP’s primary proponent has been Cornell School of Law Professor Robert Hockett.
Hockett wrote a fifty-six-page paper outlining and analyzing the viability of proposals like MRP’s.
Id. He has also blogged in support of the MRP proposal. Robert Hockett, A Solution for
Underwater Mortgages: Eminent Domain, REUTERS (June 19, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2012/06/19/a-solution-for-underwater-mortgages-eminent-domain/.
However, Professor Hockett’s paper is not entirely independent. In a conversation with
blogger Felix Salmon, MRP chairman Steven Gluckstern revealed that his company had paid
Hockett an “honorarium” to write the paper. Felix Salmon, Why Using Eminent Domain for Liens Is
a Bad Idea, REUTERS (June 21, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/06/21/why-usingeminent-domain-for-liens-is-a-bad-idea/. Reporting on his conversation with Gluckstern, Salmon
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county, MRP, or their supporters may have produced more concrete
supporting evidence, had project progressed further.184
This factor is especially unclear here because the exact details of MRP’s
plan, as it would be enacted in S.B. County, had not yet been determined.185
In fact, MRP had retooled the plan at least once (presumably) in response to
opponents’ criticism and to conform more closely to this element of
California’s statutory requirements.186 While the final plan encompassed all
mortgages, it originally would condemn only performing, current
mortgages—as opposed to those in default or with delinquent payments—
whose homeowners had good credit.187
Adding still more uncertainty to this element is the fact that the S.B.
County and California economies and housing markets are, it seems,
improving.188 More importantly, the average value of a home in San
Bernardino is actually on the rise.189 The home sales price for the county
rose 24.4% between April 2012 and April 2013.190 This rise in home values

skeptically noted that “MRP did not see the paper before Hockett published it, but seeing as how
Hockett wrote ‘The Way Forward’ [another paper on this subject] with Dan Alpert, one of the key
principals behind MRP’s scheme, there was surely no doubt about what his conclusions would be.”
Id. Hockett does disclose in a footnote that “the author is disinterested in what he is here
recommending, but may subsequently undertake more legal, financial or expository work in
connection with the proposals offered and advocated herein.” Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra
note 131, at 121 n.*.
184. If they did not, a court could have blocked eminent domain actions brought pursuant to the
plan for failure to provide “substantial evidence,” amounting to “gross abuse of discretion.” Santa
Cruz Cnty. Redev. Agency v. Izant, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 371 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[G]ross abuse of
discretion may be shown by a lack of substantial evidence supporting the resolution of necessity.”).
185. MRP notes that its plan is adaptable to local conditions: “Each local government has the
power to determine whether to acquire loans, and if so which loans.” Fact or Fiction, supra note 63.
186. See Imran Ghori, San Bernardino County: Mortgage Aid Expanded, PRESS ENTERPRISE
(Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.pe.com/local-news/politics/imran-ghori-headlines/20120906-sanbernardino-county-mortgage-aid-expanded.ece [hereinafter Ghori, Mortgage Aid Expanded].
187. Id. The original policy was made “because of the increased risk and difficulty of refinancing
such loans.” Id.
188. See Nelson, supra note 5554. According to a DataQuick Information Systems report
released in October 2012, California foreclosure rates actually dropped to the lowest level since
2007 (a 31% drop in number of foreclosures statewide). Id. In S.B. County specifically, there had
been a nearly 22% drop at the time of the DataQuick report. Id.
189. CAL. ASS’N OF REALTORS, SAN BERNARDINO 2012 ECONOMIC PROFILE, available at
http://www.realtor-info.com/reports/sbeconomicreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
190. Id. The California Association of Realtors, citing a DataQuick Information Systems Report,
reports that the median countywide home value rose from $156,000 to $194,000 between April 2012
and April 2013. Id.
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and fall in foreclosure rates weakened the argument that necessity and public
interest supported or required adoption of the eminent domain project.191
2. Project Must Be Arranged in Manner Most Compatible with the
Greatest Public Good and the Least Private Injury
Second, is the project planned in a manner that will be most compatible
with the greatest public good and the least private injury? Again, this is a
fact-sensitive inquiry that allows for a great degree of legislative
deference.192 In order to determine the answer to this question, the purpose
of this proposal must be examined and it must be determined whether the
use of eminent domain is “most compatible” with achieving that purpose.193
If the purported purpose of the plan is to keep homeowners in their
homes, it is not difficult to see how the originally proposed plan might have
been attacked as ill-tailored to those purposes: homeowners still making
their monthly mortgage payments are more valuable to the holders of those
loans than homeowners in default (so the proposal would maximize private
harm), and restructuring the loans of homeowners that can afford to pay
does not target the group most likely to lose their homes to foreclosure (so
the proposal would minimize public benefit).194 Wisely, after the initial
wave of controversy following the plan’s announcement, MRP decided to
change this and include delinquent homeowners and those in default in the
program.195 The expansion of the program would increase the number of
eligible homeowners from 3,500 to 15,000, according to MRP executive
chairman Steven Gluckstern.196
Including more loans in the program necessarily increases the amount of
private loss to loan holders, but it also increases the public benefit to
homeowners. Accordingly, including the homeowners most likely to need
assistance will make the ratio of private loss to public gain more favorable,
increasing its odds of passing statutory muster. Whether the statutory
requirement would have actually been satisfied, however, is far from clear
191. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (reiterating the stated purposes of the
Homeownership Protection Program).
192. See supra note 177–78 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 175, 180 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 186–87 and accompanying text.
195. See Ghori, Mortgage Aid Expanded, supra note 186.
196. Id.
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and will remain unanswered.197
3. Particular Property Must Be Necessary to Proposal
Finally, the specific property sought (in this case, any particular
mortgages on underwater property) must be necessary for the project.198 The
traditional (and lenient) standard used for necessity here is whether the
property is “reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement.”199 When a
taking entity condemns property, it must first approve a “resolution of
necessity.”200 Once approved, the element of necessity is conclusively
established, with a few enumerated exceptions: when (a) the property is
outside the entity’s boundaries;201 (b) the resolution is affected by gross
abuse of discretion;202 or (c) the resolution is adopted through bribery.203
Once the municipality determines that the use of eminent domain is
necessary and approves a resolution of necessity, it will take fairly

197. Extrapolating this logic, the proposal would be even more likely to pass muster on this
element if it only included delinquent mortgages or those in default. These are the homeowners that
are most likely to default and the loans that are least valuable to the current loan holders. On the
other hand, this introduces the risk of homeowners “strategically defaulting,” or walking away from
their mortgages as part of a financial strategy, not an actual inability to pay. Strategic Default,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/strategic-default.asp (last visited Jan. 20,
2014).
198. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030(c) (West 2007). This question, as it relates to the S.B.
County takings, presents a bit of a paradox. MRP would not have restructured all underwater
mortgages; the proposal allowed homeowners to choose whether to actually participate in the
restructuring program. FAQs, supra note 66. (“Homeowners will have the same rights and the same
obligations that they have now . . . . If they do not refinance then they simply continue to pay on
their existing loan.”). This means that some of the condemned mortgages could have remained
exactly as they were. Id. If the county approved a resolution determining that restructuring these
loans was necessary, justifying the use of eminent domain, the county should require that the taken
loans are, in fact, restructured. If the decision to restructure a loan is completely optional at the
choice of the homeowner, condemnation of that loan could not have been necessary to the eminent
domain proposal as a whole. See CIV. § 1240.030(c).
199. City of Hawthorne v. Peebles, 333 P.2d 442, 445 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (quoting NICHOLS,
supra note 112, § 4.11[4]) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. CIV. § 1245.220 (“A public entity may not commence an eminent domain proceeding until
its governing body has adopted a resolution of necessity . . . .”).
201. Id. § 1245.250(c).
202. Id. § 1245.255(b).
203. Id. § 1245.270(a)(1). Although bribery would justify overturning a resolution of necessity,
id., there is no evidence of such impropriety in this case, and this Comment will operate under the
assumption that there is no improper or illegal activity involved.
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compelling evidence to rebut that presumption.204 However, rebuttal is
possible—for example, if the situs of the mortgage is determined to exist
outside the county’s boundaries, the resolution could be defeated.205
Additionally, “gross abuse of discretion” might be established if the
resolution is shown to be “arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in
evidentiary support,”206 or that the taking entity had already committed to the
plan prior to approving the resolution.207 Abuses of discretion that might
justify judicial rejection of resolutions of necessity include “a fatally vague
statement of purpose.”208
If a municipality passes a resolution of necessity pursuant to the MRP
proposal, it might have difficulty avoiding such excessive vagueness.209 It
will be difficult to provide definitive answers to precisely how many
mortgages will be taken, which loans will be taken, or whether the
municipality will actually restructure each loan.210 California law requires
that eminent domain proposals be sufficiently defined: “[T]hat which is left
unlimited, and is to be determined only by such future action as the [c]ity

204. See infra notes 246–61 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of judicial scrutiny of
legislative determinations).
205. See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text. See also infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing
territorial limits).
206. Redev. Agency of Chula Vista v. Rados Bros., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 240 (Ct. App. 2001);
Huntington Park Redev. Agency v. Duncan, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744, 748 (Ct. App. 1983). See also Santa
Cruz Cnty. Redev. Agency v. Izant, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 371 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[G]ross abuse of
discretion may be shown by a lack of substantial evidence supporting the resolution of necessity.”).
207. See Redev. Agency of Huntington Park v. Norm’s Slauson, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (Ct. App.
1985).
208. City of Stockton v. Marina Towers LLC, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909, 924 (Ct. App. 2009). In
Marina Towers, the California Court of Appeal rejected the city’s resolution of necessity as a gross
abuse of discretion in part because it relied on vague conclusions, such as the declaration that the
condemned property was “within a ‘catalyst site’ for [the area’s] revitalization.” Id. at 914. The city
planned to transfer the condemned property to private developers for the construction of an
apartment complex, id., but “simply trot[ted] out a laundry list of statutes setting forth a plethora of
possible purposes for condemning property.” Id. at 922. Despite having the power to review
resolutions for “gross abuse of discretion,” supra note 202 and accompanying text, state courts must
not “retrace the legislative body’s analytic route when the statutory scheme requires much greater
deference to the condemning body’s determination of necessity.” City of Saratoga v. Hinz, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 791, 807 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Izant, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
209. This would make the taking invalid under section 1240.030(c). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1240.030(c) (West 2007).
210. See supra note 198.
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may hereafter decide upon, is not defined.”211 If the MRP plan continues to
allow the borrower to choose whether to restructure the loans, there is a
strong chance that it could fail on these grounds: taking mortgages on the
theory that they might be restructured later (dependent entirely upon the will
of the individual homeowners), is likely to fall short of the required level of
specificity.212
4. Territorial Limitations
The California Code of Civil Procedure also specifies that, for local
entities, the condemned property must be within the entities’ territorial
limits.213 The entity exercising eminent domain in this case is the
Homeownership Protection JPA.214 As a joint entity, the territorial limits in
question here would have been those of S.B. County and the cities of
Ontario and Fontana.215
If the situs of a mortgage is not, in fact, located exclusively at the situs
of the real property securing it,216 then another problem might arise.217 If the
property (the mortgage) is legally located at the domicile of the creditor, the
JPA could not have condemned loans unless the current holders of the
mortgages themselves were domiciled within its physical boundaries.218
C. Violation of State Constitution?
For the most part, California courts have interpreted the limitations of

211. Marina Towers, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 923 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439,
448 (1930)).
212. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
213. CIV. § 1240.050.
214. See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part IV.B.3.
217. That is, if the mortgage is “located” at the situs of the lender—as Part III.C argues it is—the
JPA may be limited not only to loans within California, but only to those within S.B. County. See
supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
218. Part III.C presents this view. If this argument is accepted, even mortgages (or parts of
mortgages) purchased by private trusts and banks located within California would be beyond the
reach of the JPA. This could drastically reduce the number of eligible loans, further damaging the
argument for a general public good and placing additional strain on the other statutory takings
requirements. See supra Parts IV.B.1–3.
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the state’s takings clause congruently with those of its federal counterpart.219
Specifically, the only limitations provided by the U.S. Constitution are the
requirements that the taking serves a public use and that just compensation is
paid.220 California’s Constitution, however, is slightly more restrictive. It
includes a provision requiring compensation for damaged property in
addition to condemned property; furthermore, “fair compensation” must be
determined by a jury, not the condemning entity or a judge.221
1. Public Use Requirement
For purposes of the California state constitution, a public use is “a use
which concerns the whole community as distinguished from a particular
individual or a particular number of individuals; public usefulness, utility or
advantage; or what is productive of general benefit; a use by or for the
government, the general public or some portion of it.”222 MRP states that the
public purpose of its program is “to protect neighbors and the broader
community from defaults, foreclosures, and the losses that they cause.” 223
On its face, this purpose seems to satisfy the definition of public use
required by California courts: the terms “neighbors” and “broader
community” clearly suggest a purpose that concerns the whole community
and conveys a general benefit.224 Further, the JPA Authority Agreement of
the Homeownership Protection Program states the JPA was created to,
among other things, “enhance the economic vitality and the health of . . .
communities [of homeowners with negative equity].”225 This, too, sounds
like a purpose that satisfies the public use standard applied in California.
219. Small Prop. Owners of S.F. v. City of S.F., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 125 (Ct. App. 2006).
Based on this standard, state courts will likely apply the same standards discussed infra Part V.A.
regarding the U.S. Takings Clause.
220. Mt. San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Superior Court, 151 P.3d 1166 (Cal. 2007).
221. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a).
222. City of L.A. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 506 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 908 (Cal. 1995) (in bank)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This definition of “public use” originates from the Cyclopedia of Law and
Procedure. 15 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 581 (William Mack ed., 1905), available at
http://archive.org/details/cu31924061134379. However, it is still commonly cited, at least in
California cases. See, e.g., Customer Co., 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995) (in bank); Miller v. City of Palo
Alto, 280 P. 108, 109 (Cal. 1929).
223. Fact or Fiction, supra note 63.
224. Id.
225. JPA AGREEMENT, supra note 67, Recital C.
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However, public use is still a question of law to be determined by a
court.226 The California Constitution limits eminent domain to use of
property for public purposes, and if a judge decides that the plan, despite
legislative intent to the contrary, does not in fact do so, the proposal will be
shot down.227
2. Just Compensation
The second crucial element of any eminent domain action is the
requirement that just compensation be paid.228
But what is “just
compensation”? It is difficult to discuss whether the plan will, in fact,
satisfy this constitutional requirement because the JPA has not offered any
hard figures yet, and every condemnation proceeding will be unique.229
However, because this element is central to the analysis, this section will
discuss what amount of payment would theoretically have been needed to
pass constitutional muster.
In its Civil Procedure Code, the California legislature has codified
earlier court decisions defining just compensation in an eminent domain
action.230 Specifically, the state must pay:
[T]he highest price on the date of valuation that would be
agreed to by a seller, being willing to sell but under no
particular or urgent necessity for so doing, nor obliged to
sell, and a buyer, being ready, willing, and able to buy but

226. See infra notes 243–61 and accompanying text.
227. See City of S.F. v. Ross, 279 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1955) (finding use of eminent domain to be, in
fact, for private use, despite legislative declaration of public use); see generally, Timothy Sandefur,
A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California: A Rationale for Meaningful
Judicial Scrutiny of “Public Use”, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 569 (2003).
228. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
229. The JPA, exercising its assigned legislative power, is free to set forth the prices it is willing
to offer mortgage holders—“[i]ts choices, however, are not necessarily the measure of the ‘just’
compensation constitutionally due.” Redev. Agency of Burbank v. Gilmore, 700 P.2d 794, 803 (Cal.
1985). MRP acknowledges that good faith negotiations will be required. Comment Letter from
Mortgage Resolution Partners to Alfred Pollard, General Counsel, FHFA (Sept. 7, 2012), available
at http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/sites/default/files/attachments/fhfa_comment_letter_9.7.12
.pdf [hereinafter Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners to FHFA] (last visited Jan. 20,
2014).
230. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.320(a) (West 2007) (codifying Sacramento So. R.R. v.
Heilbron, 104 P. 979 (Cal. 1909) as explained in the relevant Legislative Committee Comments).
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under no particular necessity for so doing, each dealing
with the other with full knowledge of all the uses and
purposes for which the property is reasonably adaptable
and available.231
Other state court decisions have further defined the scope and purpose
of the fair compensation requirement. In City of Carlsbad v. Rudvalis, the
Court of Appeal specified that the purpose of just compensation for
condemned property is “to put the owner in as good a position pecuniarily as
he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.”232 In Joffe v.
City of Huntington Park, the court added that both federal and state
constitutional requirements look to “‘not what the taker has gained, but what
the owner has lost.’”233
To determine what just compensation should be, a hypothetical
illustration might be helpful. Take an S.B. County homeowner who
purchased a house at the peak of the housing bubble, in 2006, at $382,000.234
At the time of the MRP proposal in S.B. County, the house would be worth
$167,800.235 Assume also that the homeowner had not refinanced the
mortgage and had a current outstanding principal of $275,000.236 How much
should the JPA and MRP have paid the holder of this mortgage to condemn
it?
It seems logical that the minimum value that at which the lender would
agree to sell the loan is equal to the value of the property securing the loan
(i.e., the home). If the homeowner fully stops making payments, the

231. Id. But see supra note 229 (describing the limited nature of legislative declarations of fair
compensation).
232. 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 194, 202 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing City of San Diego v. Rancho Penasquitos
P’ship, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 118–19 (Ct. App. 2003)); see also San Diego Metro. Transit Dev. Bd.
v. Cushman, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 124 (Ct. App. 1997).
233. 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 874 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Tilem v. City of L.A., 191 Cal. Rptr.
229, 233 (Ct. App. 1983)).
234. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
236. Suppose our hypothetical borrower made a 20% down payment on the property ($76,400)
and took out a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage (“FRM”) at 6.28% (the national monthly average for
January of 2006). See HSH’s National Monthly Mortgage Statistics: 2006, HSH.COM,
http://www.hsh.com/natmo2006.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2014)). Assuming he continued making
his scheduled payments, he would currently owe $274,838 on the remaining $305,600. See
Mortgage Amortization Calculator, HSH.COM, http://www.hsh.com/calc-amort.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2014).

668

[Vol. 41: 633, 2014]

Treading Water
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

mortgage holder will at least retain the property (worth $167,800 in this
example). However, the mortgage holder will forgo the expenses involved
in the foreclosure process.237 Some estimates place this at almost $80,000,238
which would reduce the low-end estimate to $87,800. In the high-end figure
scenario—the scenario in which the homeowner continues making regular
payments until the loan is paid off—the mortgage holder would, after fully
paying off principal and interest, have received $679,535.239 The lender
would not have received the full value of the loan, however, until December
of 2035, which means that the high-end figure must be discounted to present
value—$305,977.240
“Just compensation” will likely fall somewhere between those two
values, after considering the odds of the homeowner defaulting.241
Explaining the appropriate benchmark to a jury,242 however, could prove to
be difficult, making the ultimate determination of just compensation
unpredictable.

237. They must be paid the flat compensation before the mortgage is actually taken, and
theoretically, there will be no foreclosure. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a).
238. Glenn Setzer, Foreclosures Cost Lenders, Homeowners, the Community Big Bucks,
MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (Jun. 2, 2008), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/622008_
Foreclosure_Costs.asp.
239. These figures were calculated using the mortgage amortization calculator accessible at
Mortgage Amortization Calculator, supra note 236.
240. In other words, the right to receive $679,535 over the course of twenty-three years would be
worth only $305,977 at the time of the MRP proposal. See Present Value Calculator,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/calculator/pvcal.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (using
3.53% interest rate—the average rate on a thirty-year FRM on Feb. 7, 2013—compounded yearly
over twenty-three years). See Weekly Primary Mortgage Market Survey, FREDDIE MAC,
http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (used to determine the discount rate).
An even more extensive calculation would probably include other deductions from this
present value figure, like any other demonstrable expenses forgone by giving up the mortgage
(servicing expenses, etc.).
241. San Bernardino County Real Estate Trends & Market Info, REALTYTRAC,
http://www.realtytrac.com/trendcenter/ca/san+bernardino-county-trend.html (last updated Dec.
2013).
242. A jury determination of just compensation is expressly required by the California
Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a).
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V. ANALYSIS ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL
A. Violation of Federal Takings Clause?
1. Public Use Requirement
Just as on the state level,243 federal eminent domain law does not
interpret the term “public use” to literally mean that the condemned property
must be made physically available for public access. On the federal level,
courts will generally uphold the use of eminent domain so long as the
condemnation relates to a “conceivable public purpose.”244 The taking does
not need to benefit the whole community, or even necessarily a considerable
portion of it.245
While a “purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the
public use requirement,”246 the fact that the property is taken from one
private party and transferred immediately to a different private party does
not necessarily “condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.”247
The legislative determination that eminent domain can be used for a
particular project is “deemed to be a declaration . . . that such use . . . is a
public use.”248 This declaration, however, is not completely immune from
judicial review.249
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that a condemnation action in which the state of Hawaii took private
property for the benefit of another private party did not violate the public use

243. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
244. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422 (1992) (quoting
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–34
(1954).
245. Rindge Co. v. L.A. Cnty., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923). However, the fact that the condemned
land in Rindge Co. was to be used as a highway was important. Id. at 706. In deciding the case, the
court stressed: “That a taking of property for a highway is a taking for public use has been
universally recognized,” and that the state’s code specifically named highways to be a public use.
Id. The determinations in this case seem highly distinguishable upon the facts; condemning a
mortgage has not been universally recognized as a public use.
246. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
247. Id. at 243–44.
248. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.010 (West 2007).
249. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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limitation on a state’s power of eminent domain.250 While the Court
acknowledged that its role in reviewing the use of eminent domain should be
an “extremely narrow” one, it addressed two primary issues regarding the
public use requirement.251 First, the Court held that the condemnation act
fell within the traditional scope of a “classic exercise of a State’s police
powers” to regulate the perceived social and economic evils of a land
oligopoly traceable to Hawaii’s original monarchical and feudal system of
land ownership.252 Second, the state act’s method of redistributing the
parcels of land was considered rational.253
The Court set a very low standard for scrutinizing public purpose in
Midkiff, one that the MRP proposal could very well satisfy. In order to have
met the federal standard of public purpose, it must only be determined that
the county could have rationally believed that this proposal would promote
its objective: reducing foreclosures on underwater mortgages.254 This is a
question of fact, and one that will probably be analyzed using the same
standards as those on the state level, if not with slightly more deference to
the county’s determination.255
Midkiff does demonstrate, however, that the Supreme Court does have
the power to review state eminent domain proceedings for “rationality.”256
Despite the Court’s expressed reluctance, it did in fact look at the details of
the plan and factually determined whether, in its opinion, the act was
rational.257 So, even if it is determined that state and federal takings clauses
use the same standard for public use, there is still room for separate U.S.
Supreme Court review under the federal version of the clause.
250. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
251. Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
252. Id. at 241–42.
253. Id. at 242. Specifically, the constitutionality test is satisfied if the state legislature
“rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective.” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–72 (1981)).
254. See id.
255. See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing judicial limitations on public use determinations).
256. This suit was filed in federal court, where the Court of Appeals rejected the legislature’s
determination that the act served a public use. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 234–35. The decision was
reversed not because the appellate court acted beyond its power to review, but because it applied the
wrong level of scrutiny in its review. Id. at 243 (rejecting the appellate court’s decision that the
taking in question warranted “more rigorous judicial scrutiny”).
257. Id. at 240 (“There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature’s
judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is equated with the
police power.”).
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If MRP’s proposal survived Supreme Court scrutiny on the public use
factor, the Court’s holding would depend greatly on the factual information
available to the county at the time it passes the resolution of necessity.258
Other than the paper written by Professor Robert Hockett,259 the majority of
then-available information suggests that the negative consequences outweigh
the positive.260 This certainly cuts against finding that the plan satisfies the
rationality standard; however, Midkiff sets the level of legislative deference
so high that the federal Takings Clause will provide little scrutiny of public
use beyond California’s statutory and constitutional requirements.261
2. Just Compensation Requirement
Like the California Constitution’s takings clause,262 the U.S. Takings
Clause also contains a just compensation requirement.263 The Fifth
Amendment prohibits the taking of “private property . . . for public use,
without just compensation.”264 The just compensation clause here is less
restrictive than its California counterpart in that (1) it lacks the jury
requirement of the California Constitution, and (2) it does not require the
compensation be paid before the taking.265 Because it is less restrictive, the
just compensation requirement of the U.S. Takings Clause will likely
provide little constitutional protection above and beyond that provided by
the California Constitution—if it satisfies the state requirement, the federal
clause is not likely to obstruct the MRP proposal.266

258. See supra Part IV.B.3.
259. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, supra note 91.
261. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the relevant statutory limitations); supra Part IV.C
(discussing the relevant state constitutional limitations).
262. See supra Part IV.C.
263. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
264. Id.
265. California’s takings clause expressly requires that just compensation be paid to the owner (or
into court for the owner) before taking the property. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a). Federal courts
have held, on the other hand, that an eminent domain action does not violate the Fifth Amendment
merely because it occurs before payment of just compensation. See, e.g., Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S.
57, 62 (1919); Liberty Cent. Trust Co. v. Greenbrier Coll. for Women, 50 F.2d 424, 429 (S.D. W.
Va. 1931) (citing precedent), aff’d 283 U.S. 800; see also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309
U.S. 18, 21 (1940) (holding that “[t]he Fifth Amendment does not entitle [the owner] to be paid in
advance of the taking”) (quoting Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932)).
266. Therefore, in the case of S.B. County and any other California municipalities considering the
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B. Violation of Contract Clause?
The federal Contract Clause prohibits state legislatures from passing any
law “impairing the Obligation of Contract.”267 While there is an argument
that the MRP proposal would violate this clause, there is mixed precedent on
the issue—it is uncertain how successful such a challenge would be.
Eminent domain proceedings often interfere with private contracts, but the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that private property and contract rights must
yield to legitimate use of state police power.268 In Midkiff, the Court held
that “the Contract Clause has never been thought to protect against the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.”269
Interpretation of the U.S. Contract Clause has undergone a great deal of
transformation over the years: it has gained and lost popularity in cycles.
The clause was incorporated into the Constitution without record of much
debate—its creation is “shrouded in mystery.”270 At the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court applied the clause liberally; it held on
multiple occasions that private contracts, in addition to contracts with the
state, were protected by the Contract Clause from state interference.271
Eventually, the Court began to carve out exceptions. Most notably, and
of most relevance here, was the exception for contracts violated through the
exercise of certain sovereign functions, including eminent domain.272 In one
case, the Court held that Vermont had not violated the Contract Clause when
it condemned a toll bridge, the operation of which it had previously
chartered to a private party.273 The Court noted that eminent domain is
“paramount to all private rights vested under the government . . . and must
yield in every instance to its proper exercise.”274

plan, the restrictions expanded upon supra Part IV.C.2 would likely be determinative.
267. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
268. See Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
269. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 n.6 (1984).
270. James W. Ely Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV.
371, 373 (2010) (quoting FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 271 (1985)).
271. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. 164, 167 (1812) (using the clause to protect taxexemption agreements); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 142–43 (1810) (using the clause to protect
land grants).
272. See W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
273. Id. at 536.
274. Id. at 532. Although the decision appears to cut strongly in the county’s favor, the Court
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In 1934, the Supreme Court further expanded the scope of this police
power exception to the Contract Clause. In Home Building & Loan Ass’n v.
Blaisdell, the Court upheld a legislative moratorium on the foreclosure of
mortgages created during the Great Depression.275 The parallels between
Blaisdell and the MRP takings proposal are apparent (Blaisdell dealt with
state interference with mortgage contracts during a time of financial
depression); however, Blaisdell is also distinguishable due to the temporary
nature of the state interference at issue.276
By the 1940s, “[t]he advent of New Deal constitutionalism” and the rise
of modern skepticism of federal regulation had “completed the effective
destruction of Contract Clause jurisprudence.”277 But the Contract Clause
had not been completely destroyed; the Supreme Court revisited the issue in
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus.278 In that case, Justice Stewart,

here did not consider the state to have condemned the contract, as California did in Oakland Raiders
I and as S.B. County would do pursuant to the MRP proposal, but rather that the state had
condemned the land, rendering the contract meaningless in the process. Id. at 533. This case would
have been more comparable to the S.B. County proposal if the state had taken only the charter to use
the bridge, and operated it in a way more conducive to the “public good.” Justice McLean directly
addressed this in his concurring opinion:
No State could resume a charter, under the power of appropriation, and carry
on the functions of the corporation. A bank charter could not be thus taken,
and the business of the bank continued for public purposes. Nor could this
bridge have been taken by the State, and kept up by it, as a toll-bridge. This
could not be called an appropriation of private property to public purposes.
There would be no change in the use, except the application of the profits, and
this would not bring the act within the power. The power must not only be
exercised bona fide by a State, but the property, not its product, must be
applied to public use.
Id. at 537 (McLean, J., concurring). This precisely demonstrates the difference between
extinguishing a mortgage in the process of condemning a house and simply condemning the
mortgage itself, the former supported by Justice McLean’s analysis and the latter forbidden. See id.
275. 290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934).
276. The Court noted that:
Whatever doubt there may have been that the protective power of the state, its
police power, may be exercised—without violating the true intent of the
provision of the Federal Constitution—in directly preventing the immediate
and literal enforcement of contractual obligations by a temporary and
conditional restraint, where vital public interests would otherwise suffer, was
removed by our decisions relating to the enforcement of provisions of leases
during a period of scarcity of housing.
Id. at 440.
277. Ely, supra note 270, at 391–92.
278. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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delivering the opinion of the Court, addressed the decline in the Clause’s use
over the preceding decades:
Although it was perhaps the strongest single
constitutional check on state legislation during our early
years as a Nation, the Contract Clause receded into
comparative desuetude with the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and particularly with the development of the
large body of jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause
of that Amendment in modern constitutional history.
Nonetheless, the Contract Clause remains part of the
Constitution. It is not a dead letter. And its basic contours
are brought into focus by several of this Court’s 20thcentury decisions.
....
If the Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all,
however, it must be understood to impose some limits upon
the power of a State to abridge existing contractual
relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise
legitimate police power.279
The Court addressed the holding in Blaisdell and indicated that the
decision “clearly implied that if the . . . moratorium . . . had not possessed
the characteristics attributed to it by the Court, it would have been invalid
under the Contract Clause of the Constitution.”280 The Court then went on to
examine the holdings of a number of other post-Blaisdell Contract Clause
cases.281
Particularly relevant to the MRP takings proposal, the Allied Steel Court

279. Id. at 241–42 (footnotes omitted).
280. Id. at 242.
281. Id. at 243–44. See, e.g., Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936) (holding a
Louisiana law that modified existing withdrawal rights of building and loan association members as
invalid under the Contract Clause); W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (holding an
Arkansas law that exempted the proceeds of a life insurance policy from collection by the
beneficiary’s judgment creditors to be invalid under the Contract Clause since it was not reasonably
and definitively tailored to address a severe, temporary emergency for the purpose of furthering the
general welfare).
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cited W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,282 in which the Court held that
“‘[e]ven when the public welfare is invoked as an excuse’ . . . the security of
a mortgage cannot be cut down ‘without moderation or reason or in a spirit
of oppression.’”283 The Allied Steel Court also cited United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, in which the Court recognized that:
[A]lthough the absolute language of the Clause must leave
room for the essential attributes of sovereign power, . . .
necessarily reserved by the States to safeguard the welfare
of their citizens, that power has limits when its exercise
effects substantial modifications of private contracts.
Despite the customary deference courts give to state laws
directed to social and economic problems, [l]egislation
adjusting the rights and responsibilities of contracting
parties must be upon reasonable conditions and of a
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its
adoption.284
After reviewing these cases, the Allied Steel Court held that “[t]he
severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state
legislation must clear,” and that “[s]evere impairment . . . will push the
inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state
legislation.”285 This checkered history renders Contract Clause arguments
somewhat unpredictable at the federal level. While the Allied Steel case is
said to have revitalized the modern treatment of the Contract Clause after the
“near-fatal punch”286 delivered by Blaisdell, these cases are distinguishable.
Allied Steel dealt with simple contract modification through legislative
action, not contract destruction as a result of eminent domain.287 The West
River Bridge Co.288 case, on the other hand, did deal with an eminent domain

282. W.B. Worthen Co. ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs of St. Imp. Dist. No. 513 of Little Rock, Ark. v.
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
283. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 243 (quoting Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. at 60 (1935)).
284. Id. at 244 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
285. Id. at 245.
286. Ely, supra note 270, at 388.
287. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 246 (the legislative act “retroactively modif[ied]”
back pension payments and “chang[ed] the company’s obligations”).
288. W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
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proceeding, albeit one involving real property that affected a contract in a
merely consequential manner.289
The strongest argument for finding that the Contract Clause will prohibit
the MRP proposal comes from the historical function of the clause:
[The Contract Clause] was made part of the Constitution to
remedy a particular social evil—the state legislative
practice of enacting laws to relieve individuals of their
obligations under certain contracts—and thus was intended
to prohibit States from adopting ‘as [their] policy the
repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the
denial of means to enforce them.’290
Although S.B. County framed the MRP proposal as an eminent domain
proceeding with a “voluntary” contract modification, the expressly stated
purpose of the legislative action was, at its core, to relieve citizens of debt—
“lower principal balance.”291 This was never the purpose of the eminent
domain proceedings in Midkiff or the other twentieth century Contract
Clause cases, and the fact that it is the goal of the MRP proposal may be the
most important distinction.292
At the very least, the Contract Clause will place the proposal under an
additional level of scrutiny and will keep the door open for independent
federal review of the issue. The decision in Allied Steel suggests that even if
the MRP proposal is found to be a legitimate exercise of state power, and
within the bounds of state and federal takings clauses, it could still be invalid
under the Contract Clause; indeed, all of the cases above also dealt with
otherwise legitimate uses of state power that were invalidated on Contract
289. Id. The Vermont legislature used eminent domain to condemn a bridge, necessarily
impairing and destroying a franchise agreement between the bridge’s owner and its operator. Id. at
516.
290. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934)).
291. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 56.
292. For an expanded discussion on the S.B. County takings proposal and the relevance of the
historical purpose of the Contract Clause, see Examining California County’s Controversial
Proposal to Use Eminent Domain to Provide Relief for Underwater Homeowners, AMERICAN
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (July 26, 2012), http://news.abi.org/podcasts/118-examining-californiacountys-controversial-proposal-to-use-eminent-domain-to-provide-re.
This
podcast
features
commentary by Pepperdine School of Law Professor, and former American Bankruptcy Institute
Resident Scholar, Mark S. Scarberry.
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Clause grounds alone.293
C. Violation of Commerce Clause?
Another clause of the U.S. Constitution worth considering in this
analysis is the Commerce Clause. This clause expressly grants to Congress
the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States.”294 In addition to granting this express power, the Commerce
Clause has traditionally been read to include a “dormant” clause implicitly
forbidding the States from enacting legislation that restricts or imposes upon
such interstate commerce, even in areas in which Congress has yet to
legislate.295
Adopting this interpretation, the Commerce Clause could have blocked
the MRP proposal, even without express Congressional action, if adopting
the proposal would “regulate those phases of the national commerce which,
because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if
any, be prescribed by a single authority.”296 By taking mortgages, the
condemning government entities may burden national—and even
international—securities markets by devaluing the securitized interest in
those mortgages.297 In its report analyzing the current financial crisis, the
FCIC determined that such a lack of national uniformity was a major
contributor to the collapse of the housing market.298
The Commerce Clause is most easily applied to state laws that are
genuinely “protectionist” in nature—laws that aim to economically isolate
the state.299 The MRP proposal clearly did not fit into this category of
293. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
294. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
295. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767–68 (1945) (“Whether or not
[the restriction on state regulation of interstate commerce] is predicated upon the implications of the
[C]ommerce [C]lause itself, or upon the presumed intention of Congress, where Congress has not
spoken, the result is the same.”) (citations omitted). The Dormant Commerce Clause has an
extensive history, first recognized by the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). The validity
of a state law that interferes with an area in which Congress has already acted, on the other hand, is
best discussed in terms of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
296. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767.
297. See Letter from SIFMA, supra note 95, at 2. SIFMA asserts that the proposal will create
valuation issues for the “complex contractual arrangements traded in national and international
markets.” Id.
298. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
299. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978); see also Chem. Waste
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commercial burden: it would not have actually “regulated” the flow of
commerce; rather, the MRP proposal addressed local interests and only
would have affected interstate commerce incidentally.300 The Court has
adopted a more flexible approach in such cases: it will allow statutes that
have this kind of incidental effect on commerce “unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.”301 The question becomes, therefore, not whether there is an effect
on interstate commerce, but to what degree—“the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will . . . depend on the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.”302
This test was used in the context of eminent domain, coincidentally, in
the remanded Court of Appeal hearing of the City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders case.303 After the California Supreme Court held that intellectual
Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339, 348 (1992) (finding that an additional fee on out-of-state
waste products violated the Commerce Clause); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,
544–45 (1949) (invalidating a state law for burdening interstate commerce in order to promote its
own economic advantages).
300. The JPA could only have condemned mortgages on homes located within the boundaries of
its member municipalities. See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text (outlining the JPA’s
authority).
301. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also City of Phila. v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. at 623–24.
302. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. However, slight interference with securities transactions at the state
level is usually constitutional—statutes requiring registration statements to be filed in-state, for
example, are permissible “blue sky laws.” 69A AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation—State § 6 (2013)
(exploring the constitutionality of state securities regulations); see also Merrick v. N.W. Halsey &
Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (upholding a Michigan statute that, among other things, required licensing
to sell corporate stock); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) (upholding similar statutes in
Ohio).
The actual condemnation and revaluation of securities, however, seems to reach further than
most of the burdens in these cases, and remains constitutionally untested. These decisions reflect the
pre-Depression era preference against federal regulation of securities. About the SEC: What We Do,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). Following the 1929
stock market crash, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (which created the SEC), radically altering the federal government’s involvement in the
securities industry. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77a–aa (the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78a–
pp (the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). These acts so shifted the balance between federal and
state authority over securities law that court decisions predating them provide little guidance in
predicting the modern outcome.
303. Oakland Raiders II, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Ct. App. 1985); see supra notes 136–54 and
accompanying text (discussing Oakland Raiders I, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982)). Because Oakland
Raiders II was heard by the California Court of Appeal, this interpretation of the federal Commerce
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property was subject to eminent domain to the same extent as other property,
the case was remanded to the lower courts to determine whether Oakland’s
eminent domain action was in fact a valid exercise of power.304 The case
ultimately hinged on the federal Commerce Clause argument raised by the
Raiders.305 The court held that professional football was such a nationwide
business and so completely involved in interstate commerce that acquiring a
franchise by eminent domain would “impermissibly burden interstate
commerce.”306 The court found that the local public interest in this action—
including social welfare and economic benefits—was not compelling
enough to outweigh the burden imposed on interstate commerce.307
So, the balancing test analysis proposed in Pike and applied in Oakland
Raiders II requires that the burden on interstate commerce created by the
MRP proposal not outweigh the local benefits it provides.308 If professional
football is so intermingled with interstate commerce that condemning a
franchise violates the Commerce Clause, it seems very likely that state
action affecting the mortgage industry would also prove unconstitutional, if
only because mortgages are traded on a national and international basis.309
Clause would be binding precedent on the MRP proposal as utilized in S.B. County, or anywhere
else in California.
304. See supra notes 136–54.
305. Oakland Raiders II, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 158. Interestingly, the constitutionality of intangible
property condemnations that incidentally burdens interstate commerce appears to be a novel
question, first addressed by the Oakland Raiders II court here. Id. at 156.
306. Id. at 156–57. The court found a recent California Supreme Court case dealing with
interstate commerce and the NFL supported this view. See Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football
Co., 668 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1983).
307. Oakland Raiders II, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 158. The court determined that the Commerce Clause
violation obviated the need to even consider the public use requirement. Id.
308. Supra note 302–03 and accompanying text.
309. The federal interest in securities-based investment companies is demonstrated by, among
other things, the treatment of these companies in the Securities Act and the Security Exchange Act.
See supra note 302. For example, the Securities Exchange Act protects these companies from
certain acts of state interference, on the theory that these investment companies are “affected with a
national public interest,” and that:
[T]he activities of such companies, extending over many States, their use of
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and the wide geographic
distribution of their security holders, make difficult, if not impossible,
effective State regulation of such companies in the interest of investors.
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a), (a)(5) (2012) (emphasis added). The congressional
intent expressed in these regulations suggests that the MBSs that contain S.B. County’s mortgages
might also be “affected with a national public interest”—by involuntarily revaluing such securities
through the condemnation of mortgages, municipalities like S.B. County might be stepping on the
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While the burden created by each individual taking may seem insignificant,
the nature of mortgages—regulation of the housing industry, roles of the
GSEs, nationally controlled interest rates, etc.—suggest that this sort of
action could have serious effects that impermissibly extend beyond the
borders of the state.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
While the squabbles of local politicians might not seem to warrant the
level of attention currently garnered,310 this debate did in fact have
widespread significance, both legally and practically. Judicial approval of
the MRP proposal would likely have redefined our legal understanding of
state sovereignty, intangible property rights, and the economic direction of
the post-housing-crisis world. The unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable,
question remaining today is whether the dire consequences of enacting the
MRP proposal outweigh those of not acting at all.
The true danger, in the eyes of MRP’s opponents,311 lies not in the legal
precedent set by the proposal, but in its more practical implications—the
financial and economic consequences of using eminent domain to take
mortgages.312 In its Federal Register notice,313 the FHFA cited as paramount
its fear that programs like MRP’s would make credit less available to new
potential homeowners, as well as to potential investors.314
The
“unquantifiable new risk” of municipal use of eminent domain on mortgages
will force mortgage originators to retool their lending policies.315 The
mortgage industry claims that these eminent domain proposals will result in
significant loss to originators, providing them with less funding for
extending future credit and forcing them to “underwrite in a defensive
manner.”316 The citizens of the taking municipalities will ultimately bear the
toes of the federal government. See id.
310. Countless national media outlets have covered S.B. County’s handling of the mortgage crisis
in recent months, from the Los Angeles Times, supra notes 13, 97, to the New Yorker, supra note 37.
311. Most notably SIFMA, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, and the FHFA, see supra
notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
312. See Letter from SIFMA, supra note 95.
313. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
314. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47652 (Aug. 9,
2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-09/pdf/2012-19566.pdf.
315. Letter from SIFMA, supra note 95, at 2.
316. Id.
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burden of the plan—it will discourage mortgage originators from lending in
these municipalities and make credit less accessible.317
Taxpayers nationwide would also feel the losses caused by municipal
mortgage takings through the extinguishing of federally held investment
interest. The FHFA expressed fears that municipalities might target
mortgages in which GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac318 hold an
investment interest.319 While MRP has never intended to take wholly owned
GSE mortgages,320 the GSEs also own mortgage-backed securities secured
by private mortgages.321 When a city or county takes property, they take it
free and clear of any interest burdening it.322 Therefore, these “secured”
mortgage interests in GSE investment portfolios, in addition to those in
private investment funds across the globe,323 would simply disappear,
saddling taxpayers with the loss.324
The most dangerous consequences of the successful enactment of the

317. Id. However, politicians are already challenging the mortgage industry’s right to adjust its
lending practices in this way. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
318. GSEs are “privately held corporations with public purposes created by the U.S. Congress to
reduce the cost of capital for certain borrowing sectors of the economy.” Definition of ‘GovernmentSponsored Enterprise-GSE’, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gse.asp (last
visited Jan. 22, 2014).
319. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47652.
320. MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, supra note 56.
321. At the time of their bailouts, “[t]he two GSEs . . . held between them ownership of,
guarantees on, or securities backed by over half of the United States’ $12 trillion residential
mortgages.” Oesterle, supra note 16, at 733. By owning securities backed by these mortgages, the
GSEs would therefore have partial ownership interest in the mortgages in the securitization pool—
the very mortgage interest that would be subject to eminent domain in the MRP proposal. See supra
notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
322. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 824 (2012). See A.W. Duckett & Co. v. United States,
266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924) (“[T]he accurate view would seem to be that such an exercise of eminent
domain founds a new title and extinguishes all previous rights.”); Schoellkopf v. United States, 11
Cl. Ct. 447, 450 (1987) (reaching the same conclusion).
323. For example, the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), which are also governmentsponsored entities, had amassed both GSE MBSs and PLS MBSs—the latter being the type targeted
by the MRP plan. FHFB OFFICE OF SUPERVISION, EXAMINATION MANUAL 2–3 (2007), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2671/12.1%20Inv%20Port%20Mgmnt%20Narr-1.pdf. For a more
extensive explanation of the FHLBank system, see generally FHFB OFFICE OF SUPERVISION, FHFB
EXAMINATION MANUAL (2007), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/2654/2.1%20Overview%
20of%20the%20FHLBank%20System-1.pdf.
324. But cf. Comment Letter from Mortgage Resolution Partners to FHFA, supra note 229, at 2
(claiming that taxpayers will not suffer any loss and that the plan will actually benefit the GSEs, who
will avoid the risk of future defaults).
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MRP proposal derive from the fact that it will likely be very profitable,
creating a high incentive for other investors and municipalities to follow
suit. While MRP frequently mentions that it will take only a flat fee, the true
value will come from the collateral retained by MRP’s investors: the
condemned mortgages themselves.325 This means that in the event of
homeowner default, MRP’s investors can foreclose on the home and collect
its full value—a value that will likely have risen since they paid to condemn
it.326 Like any successful business venture, there will be imitators and this
will not be an isolated incident. Before long, firms across the country will
attempt to cash in on this lucrative strategy, investing money with cities and
counties to fund condemnations. Because the MRP plan hinges on
independently acting municipalities, the end result will be countless cities
and counties across the country condemning securitized mortgages by their
own individual terms, resulting in the same lack of national uniformity
blamed for contributing to the housing crisis in the first place.327
VII. CONCLUSION
When the JSA voted to turn its attention away from the MRP proposal,
the mortgage takings controversy seemed to have come to an end. Mortgage
Resolution Partners, however, still had faith in its proposed solution to the
housing crisis and continued to encourage municipalities across California,
and the nation, to consider turning to eminent domain as the solution to their
housing woes. MRP’s CEO, Steven Gluckstern, may have phrased it best:
“[T]his is a marathon not a sprint, and we’re in the first few miles.”328 “[W]e
have had lots of conversations . . . . You’d like your first guy to have gotten
there, but maybe he drops out of the race.”329
Without a prominent community pursuing the plan, California courts
seem to have lost the opportunity to place these complex legal issues under
the judicial microscope. The questions raised by the MRP proposal,
however, will not likely go unanswered for long. On September 11, 2013,
325. FAQs, supra note 63.
326. Current trends suggest home prices in S.B. County and California will continue to rise, not
plummet. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
328. Ghori, Eminent Domain Rejected, supra note 104.
329. Lazo, County Abandons Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan, supra note 97 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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the city council of Richmond, California voted four to three to move forward
with a version of the MRP plan, making the city the likely site of the next
phase of the mortgage takings proposal.330 Banks representing some of the
nation’s largest bond investors have already fought back by filing for an
injunction against the city (the case was dismissed on procedural grounds).331
The MRP proposal suffers from a number of serious flaws that leave it
vulnerable to challenges on the local, state, and federal levels. MRP will
continue to court struggling municipalities like S.B. County and Richmond.
Inevitably, the issue will find its way into a courtroom and both sides of the
debate will have the opportunity to plead their cases. S.B. County’s
flirtation with the MRP plan has set the stage for this future conflict—one
that may prove to be among the most important eminent domain cases in
recent memory.

Michael S. Moskowitz*

330. Christie, supra note 78. Richmond’s adaptation of the plan allows the city to “invoke
eminent domain if trusts for more than 620 delinquent and performing ‘underwater’ mortgages reject
offers made by the city to buy the loans at deep discount . . . to refinance them and reduce their
principal.” Id.
331. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. City of Richmond, No. C 13-03663 CRB (N.D. Cal.
dismissed Sept. 16, 2013), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/california/candce/3:2013cv03663/268907/78/0.pdf. In the dismissal order, the district court
judge held that it is not possible to determine the constitutionality of the Richmond proposal until the
details of the plan are finalized. Id. at 2 (“Ripeness of these claims does not rest on contingent future
events certain to occur, but rather on future events that may never occur. . . . [P]ut simply, there may
never be a ‘final version.’”); see also Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Richmond, supra note 78.
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